CHAPTER 13 ATTORNEY - HACKENSACK NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

 

MICHAEL BANDLER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GEORGE KOSTAS, Defendant-Respondent.

No. A-2650-19.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued February 11, 2021.Decided March 3, 2021.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-2515-18.

Michael Bandler argued the cause pro se.

Joseph P. McGroarty argued the cause for respondent (Fitzgerald McGroarty attorneys; Joseph P. McGroarty on the brief).

Before Judges Mawla and Natali.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Michael Bandler appeals from a January 14, 2020 order denying his application to stay the proceedings on his fraud-based complaint against defendant Joseph McGroarty because he filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. He also appeals a February 25, 2020 order dismissing the complaint without prejudice for his failure to appear for trial. Because the orders under review are not final, we dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.

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Plaintiff obtained a $10,000 judgment against defendant's daughter and subsequently discovered that she owned a vehicle, later sold, which would have partially satisfied the judgment. After post-judgment discovery, where defendant initially stated that the vehicle was transferred to him, and then later admitted it was not, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging fraud. In defendant's answer, he denied all the allegations and asserted twelve affirmative defenses, including an assertion that "plaintiff's claims against [defendant] are frivolous in nature and in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59 and... Rule 1:4-8(b) and therefore plaintiff should be sanctioned."

On November 4, 2019, plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. A few days after his petition was filed, plaintiff attended a previously scheduled arbitration but refused to participate.

On December 23, 2019, plaintiff filed an application to stay the proceedings pursuant to United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), arguing that the automatic stay applied because defendant's affirmative defense seeking counsel fees was "a claim against the bankruptcy estate." Judge James P. Savio denied plaintiff's motion in a January 14, 2020 order. In his accompanying written statement of reasons, the judge explained that plaintiff was not entitled to a stay because "[s]ection 362 is only applicable where a judgment is rendered against a debtor, not suits by a debtor." The court further stated that "[a] bankruptcy judgment would have no bearing on a [p]laintiff bringing a claim, as any potential award would not be forthcoming from the [p]laintiff but rather from a defendant."

Plaintiff failed to appear for the February 24, 2020 trial believing that if he attended the proceedings, he would be in violation of the automatic stay. He also asserts in his merits brief that he had "contacted the court several times, seeking a delay in the trial, without success." On February 25, 2020, Judge Savio dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice for lack of prosecution, a remedy expressly permitted by Rule 1:2-4(a).^[1]

On appeal, plaintiff maintains that the judge's January 14, 2020 order refusing to stay the trial proceedings under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) was erroneous. He also argues that Judge Savio's February 25, 2020 order dismissing his complaint was improper as the automatic stay provision prevented the court from scheduling trial and entering the dismissal order.

We first address the finality of the trial court's January 14, 2020 and February 25, 2020 orders. The Rules that warrant dismissal of interlocutory appeals are clear. We consider appeals from final orders of a trial court and other orders expressly designated as final for purposes of appeal. R. 2:2-3(a)(1), (3). "To be a final judgment, an order generally must `dispose of all claims against all parties.'" Janicky v. Point Bay Fuel, Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 545, 549-50 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting S.N. Golden Ests., Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 317 N.J. Super. 82, 87 (App. Div. 1998)). This "final judgment rule[] reflects the view that `piecemeal [appellate] reviews, ordinarily, are [an] anathema to our practice.'" Janicky at 550 (all but first alterations in original) (quoting S.N. Golden Ests., 317 N.J. Super. at 87).

If an order is not final, or among those orders expressly designated as final for purposes of appeal, a party must seek leave to appeal from the Appellate Division. R. 2:5-6(a). A grant of leave to appeal from an interlocutory order is left to the discretion of this court, and that discretion is exercised sparingly and "in the interest of justice." R. 2:2-3(b); R. 2:2-4; Janicky, 396 N.J. Super. at 551. It is clear that we will not decide an appeal from an interlocutory order merely because the appellant's notice of appeal mischaracterized the order, the respondent did not move to dismiss, or the appeal was "fully briefed." Vitanza v. James, 397 N.J. Super. 516, 519 (App. Div. 2008).

Here, the orders under review were not final as they did not resolve all issues against the parties. Further, the February 25, 2020 dismissal order was expressly without prejudice.^[2] A dismissal without prejudice is generally not a final order from which an appeal as of right can be taken. Kwiatkowski v. Gruber, 390 N.J. Super. 235, 237 (App. Div. 2007) (order dismissing plaintiff's complaint without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:23-5 is not a final order). Further, "if a dismissal without prejudice is entered under a particular rule that itself provides for vacation of the dismissal... the order of dismissal may not be appealable unless vacation is first sought." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.2.4 on R. 2:2-3 (2021).^[3]

We recognize that we may, in appropriate cases, grant leave to appeal nunc pro tunc. R. 2:4-4(b)(2); see e.g., Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207, 209 (App. Div. 1974) (granting leave to appeal nunc pro tunc "in the interest of prompt disposition of the matter"). However, such relief is not automatic and should not be presumed as granting leave to appeal nunc pro tunc is "most extraordinary relief." Hallowell v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 297 N.J. Super. 314, 318 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Frantzen v. Howard, 132 N.J. Super. 226, 227-28 (App. Div. 1975)). In dismissing an appeal as interlocutory after it was fully briefed, we stated:

[I]f we treat every interlocutory appeal on the merits just because it is fully briefed, there will be no adherence to the Rules, and parties will not feel there is a need to seek leave to appeal from interlocutory orders.

At a time when this court struggles to decide over 7,000 appeals a year in a timely manner, it should not be presented with piecemeal litigation and should be reviewing interlocutory determinations only when they genuinely warrant pretrial review.

[Parker v. City of Trenton, 382 N.J. Super. 454, 458 (App. Div. 2006) (citations omitted).]

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We are convinced that the interests of justice do not warrant consideration of plaintiff's interlocutory appeal from the trial court's orders of January 14, 2020 and February 25, 2020. R. 2:2-3(b); R. 2:2-4. In sum, we conclude the January 14, 2020 and February 25, 2020 orders were not final orders. We also decline to treat plaintiff's improvidently filed appeal as a request for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc as there is nothing about the issues on appeal that warrant such "extraordinary" relief. See Hallowell, 297 N.J. Super. at 318.

Appeal dismissed without prejudice.

[1] The parties have not included in the record a copy of the transcript from the February 24, 2020 proceeding.

[2] Plaintiff's notice of appeal and corresponding case information statement incorrectly state that the court's February 25, 2020 order was not a without prejudice dismissal.

[3] We acknowledge that unlike Rules 1:13-7(a) and 4:23-5(a), Rule 1:2-4(a) does not, itself, specify the procedures for reinstating a dismissal without prejudice. See, e.g., Scalza v. Shop Rite Supermarkets, 304 N.J. Super. 636, 638 (App. Div. 1997). We are satisfied, however, that such a remedy is clearly contemplated by that Rule. Indeed, defendant conceded at oral argument that neither Rule 1:2-4(a), nor the court's February 25, 2020 order, precluded plaintiff from filing such an application, subject to defendant's opposition.

CHAPTER 13 ARTICLE - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HUDSON COUNTY NJ (201) 646-3333

 

RICHARD FELLOWS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PATTI E. FELLOWS n/k/a PATTI E. GENARD, Defendant-Respondent.No. A-1798-09T2.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued November 9, 2010.Decided August 1, 2011.

Thomas G. Smith argued the cause for appellant.

Mona R. Raskin argued the cause for respondent.

Before Judges Carchman and Graves.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, plaintiff Richard Fellows appeals from an order dated November 4, 2009, that granted a motion by defendant Patti Genard to enforce the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA). The order provides that plaintiff is solely responsible for a debt to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) the parties incurred prior to the divorce. The order also requires plaintiff to indemnify and reimburse defendant for the monies deducted from her wages as a result of an IRS levy and to obtain a life insurance policy with defendant as beneficiary in the amount of $250,000.

On appeal, plaintiff contends "the findings of the trial court were not sufficiently supported by the facts." Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we are satisfied that plaintiff's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We therefore affirm with only the following comments.

The parties were married in 1988, separated in December 1999, and a judgment of divorce (JOD) was entered on December 13, 2001. The JOD incorporated a PSA signed by both parties on September 24, 2001. In Article 19 of the PSA, the parties agreed that defendant would receive the former marital residence located at Cape May Beach together with her pension and tax deferred annuity, and she relinquished all right, title, and interest in plaintiff's business, known as Fellows Family Chiropractic Center.

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In Article 19.3 of the PSA, the parties acknowledged that the IRS debt was acquired during the marriage and each agreed to "separately [file] an Offer of Compromise Form with the IRS." If the IRS accepted defendant's offer of compromise, plaintiff agreed to pay it. As originally drafted, Article 19.4 stated that "[i]n the event the Offer of Compromise is not accepted by the IRS the parties agree to mediate this issue." However, that language was crossed out and replaced with the following handwritten substitution that was initialed by the parties: "The husband agrees to assume the tax liability for those years that returns were filed jointly. The wife agrees to cooperate in every way possible to reduce the amount of this liability." In addition, it was agreed that defendant would "file for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy," and plaintiff would "make all Chapter 13 payments directly to the Trustee through June 30, 2002."

Defendant filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in 2001, and both parties filed offers in compromise that were rejected by the IRS. In April 2007, plaintiff filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition listing, among other obligations, $322,562 in debt to the IRS for income taxes due from 1994 through 2005; "Assorted Employer Taxes" from 1996 through 2005 in the amount of $41,073; and "Employer 940 and 941 Tax Liability" from 1995 through 2003 in the amount of $129,611. Plaintiff was granted a Chapter 7 discharge on August 3, 2007.

When defendant learned of the discharge, she moved to reopen plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding. In a certification in support of her motion, defendant stated that she did not receive notice of the bankruptcy proceeding or plaintiff's discharge, and, based on the PSA, she demanded reimbursement for any monies she was required to pay the IRS. On February 11, 2009, the bankruptcy court entered a consent order stating that any obligation found to be due under the parties' JOD or PSA "was not discharged by the bankruptcy."

Following the entry of the consent order, defendant moved before the Superior Court to enforce the terms of the PSA. In her amended notice of motion, defendant sought an order requiring plaintiff to: (1) reimburse her for the monies that were being deducted from her paychecks as a result of an IRS levy; (2) pay "an amount that will retire the [IRS] debt within a reasonable period of time"; and (3) "complete an insurance application and submit to a medical examination . . . so that she [could] obtain a life insurance policy in the amount of $500,000.00."

The trial court initially heard oral argument on June 12, 2009, but the matter was adjourned to obtain additional information from both parties. When the parties returned to court on October 16, 2009, plaintiff argued that there was no equity in the former marital home in 2002, and that defendant should have eliminated the IRS debt by converting her bankruptcy proceeding "from a 13 to a 7." Plaintiff also argued that defendant "should be responsible for whatever penalties have accrued since 2002."

In an oral decision, the motion judge found there was "a clear and unambiguous assumption of the tax liability" by plaintiff in the PSA and that he was solely responsible for the entire tax debt, including interest and penalties. The court also ordered plaintiff to reimburse defendant for the monies deducted from her wages as a result of the IRS levy, and it directed plaintiff to obtain a life insurance policy in the amount of $250,000. The trial court's decision was memorialized in an order dated November 4, 2009.

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"Settlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy." Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (quoting Jannarone v. W.T. Co., 65 N.J. Super. 472, 476 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 35 N.J. 61 (1961)). Therefore, the use of voluntary agreements to resolve marital controversies is "`generally favored by the courts as a peaceful means of terminating marital strife and discord so long as they are not against public policy.'" Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 194 (1999) (quoting Gordon v. Gordon, 675 A.2d 540, 544 (Md. 1966)); see also Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 143 (2004). Although the "incorporation of a PSA into a divorce decree does not render it immutable," the agreement is enforceable so long as it is "found to be fair and just." Eaton v. Grau, 368 N.J. Super. 215, 224 (App. Div. 2004).

In this case, the trial court enforced the clear terms of the PSA, and its findings and conclusions are adequately supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998). Accordingly, we find no error or abuse of discretion, and we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the motion judge in his oral decision on October 16, 2009.

Affirmed.

  

These Student Loans Are Not Covered By DeVos’s Extension Of Relief

Adam S. Minsky, Esq.

On Friday, Education Secretary Betsy DeVos announced an extension of the moratorium on student loan payments, interest, and collections to January, 31, 2021.

This additional month provides critical relief to millions of student loan borrowers struggling with repayment and averts an imminent “cliff” on December 31, when the relief was originally scheduled to expire. It gives Congress additional time to potentially extend the relief further into 2021 as part of larger stimulus negotiations. And it provides President-Elect Biden, who would be sworn in on January 20, with the opportunity to enact further relief through executive action if necessary.

But not all student loans are covered by DeVos’s extension. Here’s why.

The current moratorium on student loan payments, interest, and collections is a result of the CARES Act — bipartisan legislation that was enacted in March to provide economic relief in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. But the language in the CARES Act limited student loan relief only to government-held federal student loans. This includes federal Direct loans, and a small number of other types of federal loans that were acquired by, or assigned to, the U.S. Department of Education.

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But a large volume of student loans were excluded from the CARES Act’s provisions. Three main categories of loans are excluded:

• Loans administered by the Family Federal Education Loan (FFEL) program. FFEL loans are federal loans originated by a private lender, but ultimately backed or guaranteed by the federal government. The FFEL program was discontinued in 2010, but there was still many borrowers who are repaying FFEL-program loans.
• Perkins loans are federal loans originated by colleges and universities. They are neither Direct nor FFEL loans, and are not protected by the CARES Act.
• Private student loans are purely private with no federal backing, and are issued and administered by banks and other commercial lending entities.

Because DeVos limited the extension of student loan relief to the existing moratorium under the CARES Act, the relief was not expanded to cover these other loan programs.

There is roughly $300 billion in outstanding student loans that are ultimately left out of the relief, according to the Student Borrower Protection Center. Of that, around there is $160 billion in privately-owned FFEL loans, $5 billion in Perkins loans, and $133 billion in private student loans.

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Congressional Democrats have been pushing to expand the CARES Act protections to cover FFEL loans and Perkins loans. Progressive lawmakers have also pushed for broad private student loan forgiveness, as well. The HEROES Act, which passed the House of Representatives on a largely party line vote in May, would have provided for up to $10,000 in private student loan forgiveness for borrowers in economic distress. But so far, these efforts have run into opposition in the Republican-controlled Senate.

A bipartisan group of senators unveiled a new, $900 billion stimulus bill last week designed to revive efforts to reach a compromise on broad economic relief before the end of the year. Included in this proposal is $4 billion dedicated to student loan relief. While this allocation of federal funds could be sufficient to cover an additional extension of the student loan moratorium further into 2021, specific details regarding student debt relief have yet to be disclosed, and it is not yet clear whether the current relief could be expanded to include the other types of student loans.

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MORTGAGE ARTICLE - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HACKENSACK NJ (201) 646-3333

 

MORTGAGE ARTICLE

EMIGRANT MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GINA GENELLO and FRANK GENELLO, Defendants-Appellants, and

PALISADE COLLECTION, Defendant.

No. A-1297-16T2.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted March 13, 2018.

Decided June 1, 2018.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No. F-045130-08.

Dunne, Dunne & Cohen, LLC, attorneys for appellants (Frederick R. Dunne, III, of counsel and on the brief).

Knuckles Komosinski & Manfro, LLP, attorneys for respondent (John E. Brigandi, on the brief).
​
Before Judges Hoffman and Gilson.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

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PER CURIAM.

Defendants Gina and Frank Genello (defendants) appeal from an October 21, 2016 Chancery Division order denying their motion to vacate the sheriff's sale of their home, which occurred on September 13, 2016. Because they did not receive notice of the adjourned date of the sheriff's sale, defendants argue the trial court decision constituted an abuse of discretion and resulted in "a miscarriage of justice." We affirm.

On May 31, 2007, Gina Genello executed a promissory note to plaintiff Emigrant Mortgage Company (Emigrant) for $383,500, and defendants secured the loan with a non-purchase money mortgage on their home in West Caldwell. Beginning in June 2008, defendants stopped making their monthly payments under the note and mortgage. Emigrant filed a foreclosure action on November 13, 2008, after defendants failed to cure their default. Defendants filed an answer and counterclaim.

On September 16, 2010, the parties entered into a forbearance agreement, whereby defendants withdrew their answer and counterclaim with prejudice, allowing the foreclosure to proceed uncontested in exchange for a six-month stay of the foreclosure proceedings. The agreement provided for an additional three-month stay if defendants found a buyer for their home. The agreement did not require defendants to make regular monthly payments, only monthly escrow payments. Thereafter, the court dismissed the case, assuming it had settled.

Emigrant then filed a motion to restore the action. Defendants opposed the motion, which the court granted on March 21, 2016, but on the condition that Emigrant not seek default interest when it applied for final judgment.

On December 4, 2014, Emigrant filed a motion for final judgment. On July 22, 2015, the court entered final judgment against defendants for $673,220.99 and ordered the sale of the property. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied on August 7, 2015. Defendants appealed from the final judgment and order denying reconsideration, and we affirmed. Emigrant Mortg. Co. v. Genello, No. A-0292-15 (App. Div. Dec. 2, 2016).

On May 26, 2014, Emigrant sent correspondence to defendants advising of the sheriff's sale date. Defendants requested two adjournments pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36, which postponed the sale until July 5, 2016. On that date, defendants filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, resulting in another postponement of the sheriff's sale. A lack of supporting documentation lead to the dismissal of defendants' bankruptcy proceeding, and the rescheduling of the sheriff's sale for September 13, 2016. Emigrant did not notify defendants of the new sale date.

On September 13, 2016, Emigrant purchased the property at the sheriff's sale for $100. Upon learning of the sale, defendants filed a motion to vacate the sale on September 22, 2016, arguing the sale was unfair and prejudicial absent further notice by Emigrant. The judge denied defendants' motion but extended their redemption period to November 1, 2016. Defendants now appeal on the same grounds.

On appeal, defendants seek reversal of the order denying their motion to vacate the sheriff's sale, arguing that our decision in First Mutual Corp. v. Samojeden, 214 N.J. Super. 122 (App. Div. 1986) requires this result. In Samojeden, we held that our court rules, "as a matter of fundamental fairness[,] . . . must be construed as entitling interested parties to actual knowledge of the adjourned date upon which the sale actually takes place." Id. at 123.
​
We review the trial court's denial of defendants' motion to vacate the sheriff's sale under an abuse of discretion standard. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). The Court finds an abuse of discretion when a decision is "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).

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We recognize that a court of equity may set aside a sale and provide the defendant with notice of another sheriff's sale. First Trust Nat'l Ass'n v. Merola, 319 N.J. Super. 44, 49 (App. Div. 1999). "The general rule is that when insufficient notice of a sheriff's sale is given, the preferred remedy is that which restores the status quo ante to the greatest extent possible." New Brunswick Sav. Bank v. Markouski, 123 N.J. 402, 425 (1991). The court may void the sale if the party promptly seeks relief, was unaware of the pending sale, and no innocent third parties would be prejudiced. Ibid. (citation omitted).

However, the remedy to void the sale requires "some evidence of actual prejudice to an interested party." G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Marilao, 352 N.J. Super. 274, 283 (App. Div. 2002). The power to void the sale is "discretionary and must be based on considerations of equity and justice." First Trust Nat'l Ass'n, 319 N.J. Super. at 49. We defer to that exercise of discretion, absent a mistake of law or an abuse of discretion. Ibid.

Independent of statutes or court rules, the court may grant equitable relief to set aside a sheriff's sale or to order redemption when irregularities occur in the conduct of the sale, such as fraud, accident, mistake or surprise. Orange Land Co. v. Bender, 96 N.J. Super. 158, 164 (App. Div. 1967). While we held in Samojeden that fundamental fairness entitles all "interested parties to actual knowledge of the adjourned date upon which the sale actually takes place," we did not hold that the absence of such notice requires the court to vacate the sale in every case. 214 N.J. Super. at 123.

Here, the trial court carefully exercised its discretion by crafting a remedy of extending the redemption period by ten days rather than vacating the sheriff's sale. The court balanced the equities of the parties, noting the lengthy history of this matter, where defendants had not made any mortgage payments in over eight years, while Emigrant "paid the taxes . . . paid the insurance," without "access to the collateral" securing its mortgage loan. In addition, the court noted, "There's no . . . evidence to indicate . . . there was going to be a purchase at the sale or [that] some modification . . . was underway." The court further noted that defendants were effectively on notice that the sheriff's sale would be rescheduled after the bankruptcy court dismissed their petition. In essence, the court found that Emigrant's failure to provide formal notice did not prejudice defendants. Indeed, the court gave defendants ten days to redeem the property, but they failed to make the redemption. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision.

Affirmed.

BANKRUPTCY OVERVIEW - ATTORNEY IN NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

 

BANKRUPTCY OVERVIEW

BANKRUPTCY LAW FIRM IN HACKENSACK - NJ (201) 646-3333

If you are like many Bergen/Hudson and Passaic County debtors today, you may be in a situation where you are overwhelmed with debt, having difficulty making your mortgage payments or are considering some form of debt relief such as consolidation, settlement or even bankruptcy. In any of these or similar matters, it can be difficult to determine what course of action you should take to seek relief. This is when we advise discussing your financial situation, your concerns and your goals with an experienced New Jersey bankruptcy lawyer. This is a potentially sensitive and complex matter that will have lasting effects for you and your family. With the right information and advice provided to you by an honest legal professional, you have the opportunity to make a decision that will positively impact your finances - and put your concerns at ease.

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Hi, my name is Mercedez. I recommend Rafael Gomez, he treats you as if you were family, his assistants too, they are very receptive, he will definitely solve your case, as he did with me, it was much faster than I expected and I highly recommend him .

Thousands of residents in northern New Jersey are facing difficult times due to our current economic conditions. Whether you have been affected by a job loss, divorce, medical expenses or overwhelming credit card debt, you may find yourself unsure of what your next step should be. Having to confront handling your finances can be a difficult thing to do, but ignoring them can lead to dire consequences. With the help of a caring and dedicated New Jersey bankruptcy attorney at the Rafael Gomez, Attorney at Law, P.C., our firm will work closely with you to determine your financial situation and recommend the best option for your circumstances. Rafael Gomez will not speak to you in complicated legalese, instead he will explain in simple terms the options for relieving your financial situation. Scheduling a free bankruptcy consultation is your first step towards peace of mind and eliminating your debt.

Many people assume that bankruptcy should never be an option, buying into the many bankruptcy myths that surround the process. It appears complex, frightening and may seem insurmountable, something you can never come back from. This is not the case, however, and the myths should not be believed. With the proper guidance and experienced legal support of a knowledgeable New Jersey bankruptcy attorney, it doesn't have to be the end of your life, but rather a way to begin the next chapter of it. By sitting down and evaluating your situation with you, Rafael Gomez will be able to help you decide whether a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 13 would be a better fit, as well as help you understand all of the aspects caused and affected by it, including foreclosure, credit card debt and life after bankruptcy. By thoroughly and completely comprehending both the process and all the ramifications, you can feel more comfortable as your begin to navigate through it with the help of your Bergen, Hudson, Passaic County bankruptcy lawyer at your side.

BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HUDSON COUNTY NJ - (201) 646-3333 | (2020) - YouTube

My name is Joanne and I've known Mr. Gomez for 10 years, he is an excellent attorney, does great efficiently work on cases and his staff is very efficient. Please give him a call if you need help. Thank you.