FORECLOSURE ARTICLE - LAWYER IN ESSEX COUNTY NEW JERSEY (201) 656-3333

 

DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS, AS TRUSTEE FOR RESIDENTIAL ACCREDIT LOANS, INC., Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-QSI4, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Debbie A. WEINER and Clifford R. Weiner, Defendants-Appellants.

DOCKET No. A-2110-17T4.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted October 23, 2018.Decided November 8, 2018.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Somerset County, Docket No. F-026288-16.

Christopher D. Ferrara LLC, attorneys for appellants (Christopher D. Ferrara, on the brief).

Blank Rome LLP, attorneys for respondent (Michael P. Trainor, on the brief).

Before Judges Fisher, Geiger and Firko.

122The opinion of the court was delivered by

FISHER, P.J.A.D.

For many years, New Jersey lacked a statute of limitations for residential foreclosure actions. Instead, for more than a century, our courts applied the time-bar used in adverse possession actions: twenty years. See Depew v. Colton, 60 N.J. Eq. 454, 464, 46 A. 728 (E. & A. 1900); Security National Partners L.P. v. Mahler, 336 N.J. Super. 101, 106-07, 763 A.2d 804 (App. Div. 2000). In 2009, the Legislature made up for lost time and enacted N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1, which codified Security National Partners^[1] by declaring that a residential foreclosure action "shall not be commenced following the earliest of" three points in time:

• Six years from "the date fixed for the making of the last payment or the maturity date set forth in the mortgage or the note," N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a);

• Thirty-six years from the date the mortgage was recorded or, if not recorded, from the date of execution, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(b); and

• Twenty years from the date of a default that "has not been cured," N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(c).^[2]

Defendants' contention that N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a)'s six-year time-frame applies and bars this foreclosure action, which was filed seven years after their uncured default, is without merit.

The record reveals that defendant Debbie A. Weiner borrowed $657,500 from Weichert Financial Services in 2005 and then executed in Weichert's favor a promissory note that required monthly payments, 123the last of which was scheduled for June 2035. To secure the note's repayment, both defendants executed a mortgage that was recorded in 2005 and ultimately assigned to plaintiff Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas.^[3]

There is no dispute that defendants failed to make a scheduled August 2009 payment and all later monthly payments. After four discontinued suits, Deutsche Bank commenced this foreclosure action in September 2016, more than seven years after defendants' uncured default.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WtxFlt7v8d4

Hello, my name is Eduardo. I highly recommend Rafael Gomez Law Office, they just submitted my divorce case and it was had a really professional. So I really recommend it.

The parties eventually cross-moved for summary judgment. The judge granted Deutsche Bank's motion, denied defendants' motion, and later denied defendants' motion for reconsideration. Once final judgment was entered in December 2017, defendants filed this timely appeal, arguing: (1) summary judgment should not have been entered because discovery was incomplete and there were genuine disputes about Deutsche Bank's claim, its standing to sue, and its status as a holder; (2) their answer should not have been stricken; and (3) the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. We reject these arguments and affirm.^[4]

In arguing the action was time-barred, defendants claim the six-year time frame in subsection (a) was triggered in 2009 when their default triggered the loan's acceleration. We disagree. Subsection (c) specifically provides a time frame to be considered upon an uncured default. To interpret subsection (a) as triggering the same event encompassed by subsection (c) would wreak havoc with the clearly delineated provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1. We refuse to inject such confusion into what the Legislature carefully planned when it adopted this multi-part statute of limitations.

Defendants' interpretation would also require that we ignore subsection (a)'s plain language. That provision declares that the six-year period runs from the date of the last payment or the maturity date "set forth in the mortgage or the note." N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1(a). June 1, 2035 was the date "set forth" in the note and mortgage here, and that date is the one and only date that triggers the six-year period in subsection (a). There is no ambiguity; that conclusion is what the plain language of the statute compels. See DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005). Any other conclusion would mangle the Legislature's carefully phrased statute. State v. Clarity, 454 N.J. Super. 603, 608, 186 A.3d 919 (App. Div. 2018).

In short, the three events described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1, were scheduled to occur in 2041 (six years after the 2035 maturity date), 2041 (thirty-six years after the 2005 recording of the mortgage), and 2029 (twenty years from defendants' uncured 124 default), respectively. Since the earliest has yet to occur, this suit, commenced in September 2016, was not time-barred.^[5]

BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HACKENSACK NEW JERSEY BERGEN COUNTY ESSEX COUNTY HUDSON COUNTY | (201)636-3333 - YouTube

My name is Patricia Pallets, I was recommended for Mr. Rafael Gomez from my sister-in-law Wendy Fellows and he's been dealing with her for over 20 years ago and he's an excellent lawyer and I definitely would recommend it to anyone. Thank you.

Affirmed.

[1] See Assemb. Fin. Insts. & Ins. Comm. Statement to S. No. 250 — L. 2009, c. 105 (Oct. 6, 2008).

[2] For brevity's sake, we have omitted statutory language from the descriptions of each subsection that has no bearing here.

[3] The mortgage was first assigned to Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, as trustee for certain certificate holders, in 2009, and later assigned to Deutsche Bank, as trustee for Residential Accredit Loans, Inc., 2005-QS14, the plaintiff here, in 2013. The assignments were duly executed and recorded.

[4] We find insufficient merit in defendants' first two points to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only as to the first that, in moving for summary judgment, Deutsche Bank provided undisputed evidence that it was in possession of the note, which was endorsed to it, and that the mortgage assignments were duly executed and recorded. See Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 315, 318, 53 A.3d 673 (App. Div. 2012).

[5] Although not raised, we assume N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.1 applies to defendants' argument that Deutsche Bank's suit was untimely even though the statute did not become effective until August 6, 2009, approximately the same time as defendants' default. Even if the statute had no application here, the result would be the same, since the pre-statute twenty-year time-bar described in Colton and Security National Partners would allow for the maintenance of this suit.

MORTGAGE ARTICLE - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HUDSON COUNTY NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

CAPITAL ONE, N.A., Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
James I. PECK, IV, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. A-0582-16T4.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued April 25, 2018.Decided June 18, 2018.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No. F-005201-13.

Nicolas A. Stratton argued the cause for appellant (Stratton Stepp, LLP, attorneys; Nicolas A. Stratton, on the brief).

Danielle Weslock argued the cause for respondent (McCarter & English, LLP, attorneys; Joseph Lubertazzi, Jr., of counsel and on the brief; Danielle Weslock, on the brief).

Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz, and Manahan.

1106The opinion of the court was delivered by

KOBLITZ, J.A.D..

In this appeal of an August 26, 2016 final residential foreclosure judgment, defendant James I. Peck, IV^[1] contends that, after the promissory note, without the mortgage, was sold to Freddie Mac, and Capital One, N.A. (CONA) became the loan servicer on behalf of Freddie Mac, CONA could not foreclose on his home because it did not possess the note and a valid assignment of mortgage at the time it filed the complaint. He argues that only Freddie Mac had standing to foreclose. Although we agree that in these unusual circumstances where one entity owns the note and another the mortgage, both the note and a valid mortgage assignment are required to foreclose, we affirm in spite of certain irregularities.

Freddie Mac's form 10-K annual report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides the following information. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, known as Freddie Mac, is a government sponsored enterprise (GSE) chartered by Congress in 1970. Its public mission is to provide liquidity, stability and affordability to the United States housing market. It does this primarily by purchasing residential mortgage loans originated by lenders. It does not originate loans or lend money directly to mortgage borrowers. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K, "Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation," https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX/a20174q10k.htm (last visited May 29, 2018).

BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HACKENSACK NEW JERSEY BERGEN COUNTY ESSEX COUNTY HUDSON COUNTY | (201)636-3333 - YouTube

My name is Patricia Pallets, I was recommended for Mr. Rafael Gomez from my sister-in-law Wendy Fellows and he's been dealing with her for over 20 years ago and he's an excellent lawyer and I definitely would recommend it to anyone. Thank you.

On March 10, 2005, defendant executed a promissory note to Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., (CCB) which was secured by a residential mortgage by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), for $258,750.^[2] On July 28, 2005, CCB sold defendant's note to Freddie Mac, but retained 1107the mortgage. In July 2009, CCB converted to a national bank and merged with CONA. Defendant defaulted on the loan in 2010, and did not pay the mortgage or taxes after that date. The original mortgage states: "MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for [l]ender and [l]ender's successors and assigns." MERS, which also states in the "Assignment of Mortgage" that it is "acting solely as nominee for [CCB], its successors and assigns," assigned the mortgage to CONA on February 9, 2011, more than one year after CCB merged into CONA.

At least since July 15, 2009, defendant received repeated notices that identified CONA as the servicer on the loan, although Freddie Mac remained the investor. Defendant also conceded that he made payments to CONA. In June 2012, the court dismissed without prejudice an earlier foreclosure proceeding initiated by CONA, F-003445-11, because CONA failed to comply with the court-ordered deposition of an employee who could provide information about possible mortgage irregularities. CONA brought the original note to court in that proceeding. The note was subsequently returned to Freddie Mac later in 2012.

On February 15, 2013, CONA initiated the present foreclosure proceedings. The court dismissed the contesting answer on June 9, 2015, and referred the case to the Office of Foreclosure for entry of final judgment as uncontested. R. 4:64-1. Defendant's motion for reconsideration was denied on May 5, 2016 and his subsequent motion for summary judgment was denied on November 25, 2016, after defendant's death.^[3] Defendant appeals from the entry of final judgment arguing that CONA lacked standing to foreclose.

Our review is de novo, applying the same legal standard as the trial court. Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346, 157 A.3d 416 (2017). Summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, 224 N.J. 189, 199, 129 A.3d 1069 (2016) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). If all the contesting pleadings have been stricken or otherwise deemed noncontesting, an action to foreclose a mortgage is deemed uncontested. R. 4:64-1(c)(3).

Defendant argues that because "Freddie Mac is the owner of [d]efendant's loan," it "is the only entity with the right to enforce the mortgage." He further argues that in order to validly assign a mortgage, the "assignment must contain evidence of the intent to transfer one's rights." (quoting K. Woodmere Assocs., LP v. Menk Corp., 316 N.J. Super. 306, 314, 720 A.2d 386 (App. Div. 1998)).

BEST BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEY IN BERGEN COUNTY - HUDSON COUNTY - ESSEX COUNTY - PASSAIC COUNTY | (2021) - YouTube

Hello, my name is Eduardo. I highly recommend Rafael Gomez Law Office, they just submitted my divorce case and it was had a really professional. So I really recommend it.

The court found that the material facts in controversy involved standing, and were limited to possession of the original note, endorsement of the note, the transfer of the note from CCB to Freddie Mac, and CONA's right to enforce the note. The trial court concluded, "[I]t's clear . . . that a bearer of the note endorsed in blank is the holder of the note [ ] and entitled to enforce the note pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301." Unquestionably, CONA had possession of the original note during the earlier foreclosure hearing in 2012.

In Mitchell, we held that a plaintiff may establish standing either through possession of the note or as an assignee under 108N.J.S.A. 46:9-9 "if it . . . presented an authenticated assignment indicating that it was assigned the note before it filed the original complaint." Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 224, 27 A.3d 1229 (App. Div. 2011). We emphasized this holding in Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 315, 318, 53 A.3d 673 (App. Div. 2012). Thus, a plaintiff need not actually possess the original note at the time of filing in order to have standing to file a foreclosure complaint. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. at 225, 27 A.3d 1229.^[4]

In both Mitchell and Angeles we dealt with the usual foreclosure situation where one entity owns both the note and the mortgage. As Judge William C. Todd, III said: "It is difficult to imagine circumstances where one would want to hold a mortgage, without having the right to act on the underlying debt. By the same token, there is no technical reason why the interests could not be separated in one way or another." Raftogianis, 418 N.J. Super. at 345, 13 A.3d 435. Here we have such a situation: where Freddie Mac owns the note and CCB, now merged into CONA, retained the mortgage. To preclude the possibility of one entity foreclosing on the home while the other enforces the note, we now hold that when the note is separated from the mortgage, the plaintiff in a foreclosure action must demonstrate both possession of the note and a valid mortgage assignment prior to filing the complaint.

Defendant concedes that Freddie Mac, as owner of the note, had the right to foreclose on defendant's home. Defendant argues, however, that the mortgage was not legally retained by CCB, but followed the note by force of law. We reject that analysis. The issue is whether CONA, both the successor owner and assignee of the mortgage, and the loan servicer, had the right to foreclose. "Foreclosures must normally be processed or litigated in the [s]ervicer's name." Freddie Mac, Bulletin Number 2013-22, http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/guide/bulletins/pdf/bll1322.pdf (October 18, 2013). Freddie Mac's requirement that the servicer of the loan litigate a foreclosure in the servicer's name supports CONA's assertion regarding its authority to bring a foreclosure action.

Standing is not a jurisdictional issue in New Jersey. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Russo, 429 N.J. Super. 91, 101, 57 A.3d 18 (App. Div. 2012). Depending on the equities of the particular proceeding, a foreclosure judgment may not be reversed, even if some irregularities in the foreclosure process are demonstrated by the defendant. See Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. at 320, 53 A.3d 673 ("In foreclosure matters, equity must be applied to plaintiffs as well as defendants.").

Here, MERS as nominee for CCB and its "successors" did assign the mortgage to CONA, a formality because CONA is a successor to CCB. Thus, CONA had both the original note and an assignment before filing this foreclosure complaint. The twist here is that CONA returned the original note to Freddie Mac, and obtained the assignment from MERS as nominee of CCB after CCB merged with CONA.

Given that defendant was provided more than sufficient notice that CONA was the servicer for Freddie Mac, given that Freddie 1109Mac is a GSE that publicly declares its policy to foreclose through its servicers, and given that CONA did possess the note at an earlier foreclosure proceeding as well as an assignment from MERS, we do not find the irregularities here sufficient to reverse the foreclosure judgment. We do not intend by this decision to approve the way this foreclosure was prosecuted. The note should have been in CONA's possession at the time it filed this foreclosure complaint.

Affirmed.

[1] Peck, who litigated this matter as a pro se attorney, died on July 2, 2016. We continue to refer to defendant as the party in interest in this opinion.

[2] "MERS is a private corporation which administers a national electronic registry that tracks the transfer of ownership interests and servicing rights in mortgage loans. . . . MERS, as nominee, does not have any real interest in the underlying debt, or the mortgage which secured that debt. It acts simply as an agent or `straw man' for the lender." Bank of N.Y. v. Raftogianis, 418 N.J. Super. 323, 332, 347, 13 A.3d 435 (Ch. Div. 2010).

[3] Defendant apparently filed this final motion shortly before he died.

[4] Effective February 18, 2016, three years after the commencement of this foreclosure action, a new statute required that "[o]nly the established holder of a mortgage shall take action to foreclose a mortgage." N.J.S.A. 46:18-13(1)(a). Thus to have standing to foreclose, as of the effective date of this statute, a plaintiff must have an original mortgage or recorded assignment, or be found to be the record mortgage holder in a civil action. N.J.S.A. 46:18-13(1)(b).

BANKRUPTCY ARTICLE - LAWYER IN HACKENSACK NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

 WELLS FARGO, N.A., Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHERRI Y. SCAFE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-0503-15T3.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted February 7, 2017.Decided August 10, 2017.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Camden County, Docket No. F-023370-12.

Sherri Y. Scafe, appellant pro se.

Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones, PC, attorneys for respondent (Brian Yoder, on the brief).

Before Judges Suter and Guadagno.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

PER CURIAM.

Pro se defendant, Sherri Y. Scafe, also known as Nin el Ameen Bey^[1], appeals from the August 14, 2015 Chancery Division order denying her motion to vacate a June 9, 2014 final judgment of foreclosure. We affirm.

On January 7, 2008, defendant executed a promissory note to AmTrust Bank (AmTrust) for repayment of a loan in the amount of $288,900. The note was secured by a non-purchase money mortgage on real property located at 60 Orlando Drive, Sicklerville, in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for AmTrust. The mortgage was recorded in the Camden County Clerk's Office on January 14, 2008. MERS, as nominee for AmTrust, subsequently assigned the mortgage to plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vofaeeVUTA&feature=youtu.be

Hi my name is Javi Montoya, I've been using Rafael like as a lawyer in different cases and everything is being weekly and easy.

In September 2011, defendant defaulted on the required monthly payments and Wells Fargo Home Mortgage sent defendant a notice of intention to foreclose dated October 9, 2011, by regular and certified mail at the mortgaged premises.

After defendant failed to cure the default, plaintiff filed a complaint for foreclosure on October 17, 2012. Defendant was served by regular and certified mail at the mortgaged premises on April 29, 2013. Defendant failed to file responsive pleadings and a default was entered against her on September 5, 2013. On February 20, 2014, plaintiff mailed notice of entry of default to defendant.

On March 4, 2014, defendant filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, but the matter was dismissed by the bankruptcy court twenty days later. In May 2014, plaintiff moved for a final judgment of foreclosure. While that motion was pending, defendant attempted to remove the matter to federal district court. On June 18, 2014, District Judge Robert B. Kugler remanded the matter to the Chancery Division.

Final judgment of foreclosure was entered on June 9, 2014 and a copy of the judgement was mailed to defendant at the mortgaged premises. A sheriff's sale was scheduled for August 20, 2014, but defendant filed a second petition for bankruptcy on August 1, 2014. After the bankruptcy court entered a discharge on June 19, 2015, defendant moved to vacate the June 9, 2014 judgment of foreclosure and dismiss the foreclosure complaint. The Chancery judge denied defendant's motion on August 14, 2015.

On appeal, defendant claims the Chancery judge erred in not vacating the judgment of foreclosure; the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the foreclosure judgment; plaintiff failed to join an indispensable party; and defendant pled a meritorious defense.

None of defendant's arguments have sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in our opinion beyond these brief observations. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oWuR_C5HYlo&feature=youtu.be

Hi my name is Sandro Hernandez, I recommend the lawyer Rafael Gomez, he saved me in a dui case, he did a wonderful job, I really appreciated his help.

During oral argument on her motion to vacate the judgment of foreclosure, defendant objected to Wells Fargo being a party to the matter and argued that the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), should have been joined as a party. When counsel for plaintiff noted that defendant had not challenged plaintiff's standing in her moving papers, defendant claimed that plaintiff failed to serve her with "notice of acceleration." The Chancery judge then read the acceleration provision in the mortgage to defendant and explained that the October 9, 2011, notice of intent to foreclose was served one year before the foreclosure complaint was filed. Because defendant failed to contest the foreclosure and default was entered, the judge explained that defendant waived any challenge to standing or to the sufficiency of the notice.

Almost six years after defendant defaulted on this mortgage, the matter is still pending, with defendant continuing to reside in the mortgaged premises without paying the mortgage or property taxes.^[2]

We affirm the denial of defendant's motion to vacate the June 9, 2014 final judgment of foreclosure and direct that, absent a stay by the Supreme Court, a sheriff's sale be scheduled within sixty days of the filing of this opinion.

[1] When the Chancery judge addressed defendant as Sherri Scafe, she promptly corrected the judge, stating her name was Nin El Ameen Bey.

[2] We note the observation of District Judge Kugler in his opinion dismissing a related complaint submitted by defendant against several Wells Fargo employees, which he described as "gibberish-filled":

this Court cannot rule out the possibility that Plaintiffs did not commence this matter with bona fide litigation in mind. Indeed, the content of the Pleading suggests that Plaintiffs might be attempting to capitalize on the docketing system of federal courts in general, and this District in particular, in order to: (a) assert that their Pleading is "on file" with this District; and then (b) build on this fact by self-declaring their right to a certain real estate property (seemingly, 60 Orlando Drive, Sicklerville, New Jersey), and by claiming that this property is free from mortgage encumbrances held, seemingly, by the Wells Fargo Bank.

[Bey v. Stumpf, 825 F. Supp. 2d 537, 556 (D.N.J. 2011).]

WAGE GARNISHMENT ARTICLE - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

 

INVESTORS BANK, f/k/a GLOUCESTER COUNTY FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TRAVELERS CABLE TV, INC., a/k/a TRAVELERS CABLE COMM., INC., TRAVELERS UTILITY SUPPLY, INC., TRAVELERS CABLE & UTILITIES, TRAVELERS CONSTRUCTION, TRAVELERS UTILITY SUPPLY, INC., TRAVELERS CABLE AND UTILITIES, TRAVELERS MEETING, INC., TRAVELERS TELECOM, CORP., TRAVELERS CABLE, INC., TRAVELERS CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, CORP., TRAVELERS CONSTRUCTION, LTD., BROADSTAR COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, ACCESS PROGRAM SERVICE, INC., BROADSTAR SECURITY, LLC, MILTON BELL, RUSSELL BELL, DERRICK BELL, and REBECCA E. BELL, GUARANTOR, Defendants, and
TYLER BELL, GUARANTOR, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. A-2496-15T2.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted April 25, 2017.Decided May 5, 2017.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County, Docket No. L-1283-03.

Jardim, Meisner & Susser, P.C., attorneys for appellant (Anthony Bedwell, of counsel and on the brief; Brian Baum, on the brief).

Saldutti Law Group, attorneys for respondent (Robert T. Lieber, Jr., of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges Koblitz and Mayer.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

BEST BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEY NEW JERSEY BERGEN COUNTY-PASSAIC COUNTY-ESSEX COUNTY-HUDSON | (MARCH 2021) - YouTube

Hi my name is Sandro Hernandez, I recommend the lawyer Rafael Gomez, he saved me in a dui case, he did a wonderful job, I really appreciated his help.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Tyler Bell appeals from two orders entered by the trial court. On February 10, 2015, the trial court entered judgment jointly and severally against various defendants, including Bell, for approximately $1.8 million. Bell was a personal guarantor of a promissory note issued by plaintiff Investors Bank (Bank) to defendants. In seeking to collect on the judgment, the Bank filed a motion for payment out of income directed to Bell. On December 10, 2015, the trial court ordered Bell to pay out of income the sum of $1,355.80 monthly to satisfy the judgment. On February 5, 2016, the trial court denied Bell's motion for reconsideration. Bell appealed the trial court's orders dated December 10, 2015 and February 5, 2016.

On appeal, Bell argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order requiring payment out of income because Bell was a resident of the State of Florida and lacked any contact, assets or property in New Jersey. Bell also argues the payment out of income motion was contrary to Florida law. We disagree and affirm both orders.

In presenting arguments to the trial court, both Bell and the Bank relied upon Mechanics Finance Co. v. Austin, 8 N.J. 577 (1952). In Mechanics Finance, our Supreme Court rejected the very same arguments made by Bell. The Court expressly found that a foreign corporate employer authorized to transact business in New Jersey was subject to a wage garnishment by a judgment creditor against a judgment debtor. The Court held:

[T]here [was] no discernible reason of principle or policy why a foreign corporation whose right to do business in New Jersey is conditioned upon submission to the State's judicial process should not be subject to notice that, in accordance with the statute, moneys in its possession owing to the judgment debtor have been appropriated by judicial decree to the satisfaction of the judgment and as well to an order of compliance. . . . Although the employer here is not a citizen of or domiciled in New Jersey, there is residency in the State sufficient to subject it to the statutory process thus invoked. It is subject to the State's judicial power. A foreign corporation is amenable to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts in garnishment if it could itself be sued by its creditor in this State.

[Id. at 581.]

The Bank presented evidence that Bell's employer was registered in the State of New Jersey. Bell claimed his employer, National Cable and Internet, LLC, was registered in the State of Florida and was a separate corporate entity from National Cable and Internet, Limited Liability Company, a New Jersey limited liability company.

Consequently, prior to ruling on the Bank's motion to compel payment out of income, the trial court required the parties to depose Howard Bernstein, the chief financial officer of National Cable and Internet, LLC. He had submitted a certification in opposition to the Bank's motion to compel payments out of income. The trial court opined that if National Cable and Internet, LLC was not registered in New Jersey and conducted no business in New Jersey, then the court would lack jurisdiction under the holding in Mechanics Finance. Therefore, the trial court adjourned disposition of the Bank's motion to compel payment out of income until the completion of Bernstein's deposition.

After reviewing supplemental submissions filed by the parties, including Bernstein's deposition testimony, the trial court found Bell's arguments in opposition to the Bank's motion lacked merit. The trial court concluded that National Cable and Internet, Limited Liability Company, a New Jersey entity, was an alter ego of National Cable and Internet, LLC, a Florida entity. The trial court found:

The similarities are just crystal clear in that they overlap. The names are the same, except for the spelling out of the LLC. The — you know, the officer or the formation officer, is Bernstein, who is also the CEO in the Florida organization. The members, managers, National Cable and Internet, LLC, 3965 Investment Lane, A-5, West Palm Beach, Florida. 33404 is the zip code. That's the address of the LLC in Florida. Same for the main business address. You know, they clearly are in New Jersey, formed in New Jersey. There is an extension of that Florida Limited Liability Company in New Jersey. It's not disputed that they, after forming this, updated, paid their annual fees, kept alive. They are authorized, registered to do business in the State of New Jersey . . . it's the same players, it's the same organization.

Consequently, the trial court held National Cable and Internet, Limited Liability Company was an alter ego of National Cable and Internet, LLC and therefore ordered Bell to make monthly payments out of income to the Bank.

Bell filed a motion for reconsideration from the order compelling payment out of income. He argued that despite the trial court finding jurisdiction over Bell's employer, National Cable and Internet, LLC, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Bell personally.

In response to the reconsideration motion, the Bank argued that by signing the personal guaranty, Bell waived any jurisdictional objections. The personal guaranty signed by Bell provided

(201)646-3333 | BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HACKENSACK NEW JERSEY | OAKLAND - MAHWAH - MONTVALE - (2021) - YouTube

Hello friends, my name is Ingrid, I'm a client of Rafael Gomez he did a a little case to me and everything went fine and I will recommend to all of you.

:

If there is a lawsuit, Guarantor agrees upon Lender's request to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Gloucester County, State of New Jersey. . . . This Guaranty shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey.

Based upon Bell's waiver of jurisdiction by signing the personal guaranty, the trial court held that Bell's consent to jurisdiction extended not only to the collection lawsuit but also to post-judgment collection applications as well. Defendant's counsel was unable to cite any case establishing that waiver of jurisdiction in a personal guaranty was limited to collection litigation and not applicable to post-judgment collection applications. The trial court denied Bell's reconsideration motion finding no new facts or evidence submitted in support of the motion and that Bell failed to demonstrate the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner.

Given the equitable nature of the remedy created by the trial court in this case, the standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion. See Sears Mortg. Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326, 354 (1993) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the equities when formulating a remedy). Similarly, appellate review of a trial court's decision on a motion for reconsideration is the same abuse of discretion standard. See Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996). Applying this standard to the orders on appeal, we find no abuse of discretion.

The trial court found jurisdiction over Bell as well as Bell's employer. The trial court properly determined National Cable and Internet, LLC was doing business in New Jersey through its alter ego National Cable and Internet, Limited Liability Company. The Bank's application was a request for a wage execution directed to Bell's employer, a New Jersey company. Because Bell's employer was a New Jersey company, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order requiring payment from Bell's wages. The trial court also properly concluded it had jurisdiction over Bell personally based upon the waiver of jurisdiction provision in the personal guaranty executed by Bell.

Affirmed.

FORECLOSURE ARTICLE - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

SANTANDER BANK, N.A., Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GARRETT F. GRIGGS and LAURA F. GRIGGS, Defendants-Appellants, and

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant.

No. A-0705-15T1.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted July 25, 2017.Decided August 4, 2017.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Union County, Docket No. F-11977-10.

Garrett F. Griggs and Laura F. Griggs, appellants pro se.

Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones, PC, attorneys for respondent (Sonya Gidumal Chazin, on the brief).

Before Judges Reisner and Suter.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants Garrett and Laura Griggs (defendants) appeal an August 21, 2015 order that denied their motion to vacate a May 11, 2015 final judgment foreclosing their interest in certain residential real estate. We affirm.

I.

In September 2006, defendants executed a $315,000 note to U.S. Mortgage Corporation (U.S. Mortgage) and a non-purchase money mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for U.S. Mortgage, on a residential property in the City of Union, Union County. The mortgage was recorded.

Defendants defaulted on the note in August 2009. In October 2009, a notice of intention to foreclose the mortgage was sent to defendants at their address in Union, which advised defendants they were in default and the amount needed to cure.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q2Jb8iLXNSM&feature=youtu.be

My name is Stephanie Rosado, my family and I have been using Mr. Gomez as our attorney for a really long time, he's been very useful and he can help you too. So give him a call now.

Defendants' mortgage was assigned by MERS to Sovereign Bank in February 2010 and recorded. Also in February 2010, Sovereign Bank filed a foreclosure complaint, which was personally served on defendants. Defendants did not respond and a default was entered.

Sovereign Bank, N.A. was substituted for Sovereign Bank. Plaintiff Santander Bank, N.A. (plaintiff), formerly known as Sovereign Bank, N.A., filed an amended foreclosure complaint in December 2013. Defendants were served by mail when personal service on defendants was not successful. Defendants acknowledge receiving the amended foreclosure complaint by mail on March 10, 2014. Defendants did not answer the amended complaint, explaining that they were "trying to get in touch with the mortgage lender for some time" and were both ill. A default was entered against defendants on December 2, 2014.

Plaintiff requested entry of a final judgment of foreclosure in May 2015. Defendants claim they did not receive notice of this, but the record shows the notice of motion was sent to defendants' address in Union. When there was no opposition to the application, a final judgment of foreclosure was entered on May 11, 2015. wclaim not to have received a copy of the final judgment, but the record shows it was mailed to their address in Union.

Efforts commenced by plaintiff to sell the property at a sheriff's sale. Defendants filed a motion to vacate the final judgment of foreclosure, but on August 21, 2015, the trial court denied defendants' motion. The foreclosed property was sold to plaintiff on August 26, 2015.

On appeal, defendants contend the court erred in denying the motion to vacate the final judgment of foreclosure because they "raised legally sufficient questions as to the merits of respondent's foreclosure action and legal justification." Defendants also claim plaintiff lacked standing to foreclose.

We do not know whether the court issued a memorandum decision or placed its reasons on the record when it denied defendants' motion, but the record does not include the court's findings nor have the parties supplied a transcript or written decision. See R. 1:7-4(a) ("The court shall by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury. . . ."). We could remand the case to the trial court for clarification, but under Rule 2:10-5, we also "may exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary to the complete determination of any matter on review." Here, the record enables us to resolve the issues without a remand.

(201)646-3333 | SPECIALIST BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEY | New Jersey, New York, Newark, Hackensack | (2021) - YouTube

Hi guys my name is Vanessa Reynoso I hired mr. Gomez as one of my lawyer for me, to help me out and I could have been more happier with his help so I recommend you guys if you guys need any help to hire him, because he'll get you out of a bad situation.

We review the trial court's order denying defendants' Rule 4:50-1 motion to vacate the final judgment of foreclosure, under an abuse of discretion standard. Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994) (citations omitted). Defendants have not disputed the amount owed in the final judgment of foreclosure or that the mortgage is in default. Defendants never contested the application of this mortgage to their residential property. As such, they acknowledge the primary facts needed to foreclose on the property. See Great Falls Bank v. Pardo, 263 N.J. Super. 388, 394 (Ch. Div. 1993) (citations omitted) ("The only material issues in a foreclosure proceeding are the validity of the mortgage, the amount of the indebtedness, and the right of the mortgagee to resort to the mortgaged premises."), aff'd, 273 N.J. Super. 542 (App. Div. 1994).

Defendants' principal contention is that plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the foreclosure action. In a foreclosure matter, a party seeking to establish its right to foreclose on the mortgage must generally "own or control the underlying debt." Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 222 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ford, 418 N.J. Super. 592, 597 (App. Div. 2011)). See also Bank of N.Y. v. Raftogianis, 418 N.J. Super. 323, 327-28 (Ch. Div. 2010) (citations omitted). In Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 315, 318 (App. Div. 2012), we held that "either possession of the note or an assignment of the mortgage that predated the original complaint confer[s] standing," thereby reaffirming our earlier holding in Mitchell, supra, 422 N.J. Super. at 216.

Here, in making application for the final judgment of foreclosure, the bank's representative certified that plaintiff Santander Bank, N.A. was the "holder of the aforesaid note." Also, an attorney for plaintiff certified as required by Rule 4:64-2(d) about communications with plaintiff's employee who personally reviewed the affidavit of the amount due and the original note, mortgage and assignments. The mortgage to Sovereign Bank was recorded before any foreclosure complaint was filed. Sovereign Bank then became Santander Bank. "Given that the mortgage was properly recorded and appears facially valid, under New Jersey law there is a presumption as to its validity, and the burden of proof as to any invalidity is on the party making such an argument." In re S.T.G. Enters., Inc., 24 B.R. 173, 176 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (citations omitted). Defendants submitted nothing to the court to overcome this presumption. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate because plaintiff was assigned the mortgage and held the note prior to filing the complaint or amended complaint.

After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable legal principles, we conclude that defendants' further arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.