Some property is protected, or exempt from your creditors' claims, and you get to keep it. When determining what is considered exempt, many states allow you to choose and use the state's definition of exempt or the list set out by federal law. Some states require you to use the state's list. Be sure to check your state's laws to find out what applies to your state.
A chapter 7
case begins with the debtor filing a petition with the bankruptcycourt serving
the area where the individual lives or where the business debtor is organized
or has its principal place of business or principal assets. (3) In addition to
the petition, the debtor must also file with the court: (1) schedules of assets
and liabilities; (2) a schedule of current income and expenditures; (3) a
statement of financial affairs; and (4) a schedule of executory contracts and
unexpired leases. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(b). Debtors must also provide the
assigned case trustee with a copy of the tax return or transcripts for the most
recent tax year as well as tax returns filed during the case (including taxreturns for prior years that had not been filed when the case began). 11 U.S.C.
§ 521. Individual debtors with primarily consumer debts have additional
document filing requirements. They must file: a certificate of credit counseling and a copy of any debt repayment plan developed through credit counseling; evidence of payment from employers, if any, received 60 days before
filing; a statement of monthly net income and any anticipated increase in
income or expenses after filing; and a record of any interest the debtor has in
federal or state qualified education or tuition accounts. Id. A husband and
wife may file a joint petition or individual petitions. 11 U.S.C.
§ 302(a). Even if filing jointly, a husband and wife are subject to all
the document filing requirements of individual debtors. (The Official Forms may
be purchased at legal stationery stores or download. They are
not available from the court.)
The courts must charge a $245 case filing fee, a $75 miscellaneous administrative fee, and
a $15 trustee surcharge. Normally, the fees must be paid to the clerk of the
court upon filing. With the court's permission, however, individual debtors may
pay in installments. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006(b);
BankruptcyCourt Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, Item 8. The number of installments
is limited to four, and the debtor must make the final installment no later
than 120 days after filing the petition. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006. For cause
shown, the court may extend the time of any installment, provided that the last
installment is paid not later than 180 days after filing the petition. Id. The
debtor may also pay the $75 administrative fee and the $15 trustee surcharge in
installments. If a joint petition is filed, only one filing fee, one administrative
fee, and one trustee surcharge are charged. Debtors should be aware that
failure to pay these fees may result in dismissal of the case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(a).
If the
debtor's income is less than 150% of the poverty level (as defined in the
Bankruptcy Code), and the debtor is unable to pay the chapter 7 fees even in
installments, the court may waive the requirement that the fees be paid. 28
U.S.C. § 1930(f).
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In order to
complete the Official Bankruptcy Forms that make up the petition, statement of
financial affairs, and schedules, the debtor must provide the following
information:
A list of all
creditors and the amount and nature of their claims;
A detailed
list of the debtor's monthly living expenses, i.e., food, clothing, shelter,
utilities, taxes, transportation, medicine, etc.
Married
individuals must gather this information for their spouse regardless of whether
they are filing a joint petition, separate individual petitions, or even if
only one spouse is filing. In a situation where only one spouse files, the
income and expenses of the non-filing spouse are required so that the court,
the trustee and creditors can evaluate the household's financial position.
Among the
schedules that an individual debtor will file is a schedule of
"exempt" property. The Bankruptcy Code allows an individual debtor(4) to protect some property from the claims of creditors because it is exempt
under federal bankruptcylaw or under the laws of the debtor's home state. 11
U.S.C. § 522(b). Many states have taken advantage of a provision in the
Bankruptcy Code that permits each state to adopt its own exemption law in place
of the federal exemptions. In other jurisdictions, the individual debtor has
the option of choosing between a federal package of exemptions or the
exemptions available under state law. Thus, whether certain property is exempt
and may be kept by the debtor is often a question of state law. The debtorshould consult an attorney to determine the exemptions available in the state
where the debtor lives.
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Filing a
petition under chapter 7 "automatically stays" (stops) most
collection actions against the debtor or the debtor's property. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362. But filing the petition does not stay certain types of actions
listed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b), and the stay may be effective only for a
short time in some situations. The stay arises by operation of law and requires
no judicial action. As long as the stay is in effect, creditors generally may
not initiate or continue lawsuits, wage garnishments, or even telephone calls
demanding payments. The bankruptcy clerk gives notice of the bankruptcy case to
all creditors whose names and addresses are provided by the debtor.
Between 21
and 40 days after the petition is filed, the case trustee (described below)
will hold a meeting of creditors. If the U.S. trustee or bankruptcyadministrator (5) schedules the meeting at a place that does not have regular
U.S. trustee or bankruptcy administrator staffing, the meeting may be held no
more than 60 days after the order for relief. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2003(a). During
this meeting, the trustee puts the debtor under oath, and both the trustee and
creditors may ask questions. The debtor must attend the meeting and answer
questions regarding the debtor's financial affairs and property. 11 U.S.C.
§ 343. If a husband and wife have filed a joint petition, they both must
attend the creditors' meeting and answer questions. Within 10 days of the
creditors' meeting, the U.S. trustee will report to the court whether the case
should be presumed to be an abuse under the means test described in 11 U.S.C.
§ 704(b).
It is
important for the debtor to cooperate with the trustee and to provide any
financial records or documents that the trustee requests. The Bankruptcy Code
requires the trustee to ask the debtor questions at the meeting of creditors to
ensure that the debtor is aware of the potential consequences of seeking a discharge
in bankruptcy such as the effect on credit history, the ability to file a
petition under a different chapter, the effect of receiving a discharge, and
the effect of reaffirming a debt. Some trustees provide written information on
these topics at or before the meeting to ensure that the debtor is aware of
this information. In order to preserve their independent judgment, bankruptcyjudges are prohibited from attending the meeting of creditors. 11 U.S.C.
§ 341(c).
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In order to
accord the debtor complete relief, the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to
convert a chapter 7 case to a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13 (6) as long as
the debtor is eligible to be a debtor under the new chapter. However, a
condition of the debtor's voluntary conversion is that the case has not
previously been converted to chapter 7 from another chapter. 11 U.S.C.
§ 706(a). Thus, the debtor will not be permitted to convert the case
repeatedly from one chapter to another.
It is a common myth that bankruptcy will "ruin" your credit. The truth is that after your bankruptcy is compete, you will have no unpaid debt on your credit report and you will now be able to rebuild your credit through careful financial management and paying your bills in a timely manner. While you may face increased interest rates on any new credit cards or car loans, if you pay them off regularly and show your creditors you are being responsible financially, your credit score can improve dramatically within just a few years. Every person's financial history is unique and you should speak to an experienced northern New Jerseybankruptcylawyer from Bergen, Hudson and Passaic County like Rafael Gomez to get more information on what to expect after you are finished with your bankruptcy.
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We have successfully helped hundreds and hundreds of our clients eliminate their debt and start building a new financial future for themselves and their families through bankruptcy. Rafael Gomez is dedicated to helping individuals and business owners protect their valuable assets and get relief from the harassment of collection agencies while using bankruptcy to either discharge all their unsecured debt through chapter 7 or reorganize and pay off their debt over time with chapter 13. When you come to speak with Rafael Gomez for your free bankruptcyconsultation, we will review your finances and advise you on what your best options are.
Another step in restoring your good credit after bankruptcy involves reviewing your various credit reports to make sure that any remaining derogatory comments are removed. While there are companies that advertise to do this for you, it is something you can do yourself. There are other methods of improving your credit rating including secured credit cards and getting a co-signed loan with another person who has good credit. Making the payments and paying off such loans reflects well on both party's credit reports. To discuss what you can expect after your bankruptcy, speak to an experienced bankruptcy lawyer like Rafael Gomez.
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REGINA S. BAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. JOSEPH GIBBONS, TANYA WOOD, DAVID WATKINS, ESQ., THE CITY OF ENGLEWOOD, ENGLEWOOD POLICE OFFICER THORNTON WHITE, ENGLEWOOD POLICE OFFICER GONZALEZ, and ENGLEWOOD LIEUTENANT BARRETT, Defendants-Respondents, and PAT PRIANT and RUSSO REALTY, Defendants, and KELLY BERTEN[1] ROCCO, ESQ., Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. JAMES M. MARKS, II, ESQ., Third-Party Defendant.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-0673-09.
James M. Marks, II, argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (The Law Firm of James M. Marks, II, attorneys; Nicolas G. Rotsides, on the briefs).
David M. Watkins, respondent pro se.
Adam J. Adrignolo argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP, attorney; Christopher J. Carey, of counsel; Adam J. Adrignolo and Michelle M. O'Brien, on the briefs).
Marc D. Mory argued the cause for respondents City of Englewood, Englewood Police Officer Thornton White, Englewood Police Officer Gonzalez, and Englewood Lieutenant Barrett (Dvorak & Associates, LLC, attorneys; Lori A. Dvorak, of counsel; Marc D. Mory, on the brief).
Respondents Joseph Gibbons and Tanya Wood have not filed briefs.
Before Judges Sabatino, Haas and Mitterhoff.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, the Estate of Regina Bailey,[2] appeals various rulings of the trial court in this complicated case arising out of her removal from her former marital residence and the alleged destruction of her belongings. Among other things, plaintiff has asserted claims against: the purchasers of the residence, Joseph Gibbons and Tanya Wood; the purchasers' attorney David Watkins, Esq.; her former attorney Kelly Berten Rocco, Esq.; and the City of Englewood as well as various police officers of the City who took part in the forcible removal of plaintiff from the residence.
We need not recite here the lengthy procedural history of this litigation. It will suffice to say that the trial court and the federal court have issued various successive orders, among other things, dismissing plaintiff's legal malpractice and other claims against attorneys Rocco and Watkins, and dismissing plaintiff's claims alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and its officials.
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After plaintiff amended the complaint to assert the Section 1983 claims, the matter was temporarily removed to the federal court. The federal court dismissed the Section 1983 claims and thereafter remanded the case to the Law Division. Further orders were issued by the Law Division, and plaintiff appealed to this court. Questions then arose concerning whether the rulings appealed from had disposed of all issues and all parties, as required to confer appellate jurisdiction upon this court pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a)(1). Those concerns resulted in a May 19, 2014 order remanding the case back to the trial court for lack of finality.
Further questions arose concerning whether the trial court had made a final disposition of the claims against Gibbons and Wood, the homebuyers, following the remand from federal court. That uncertainty resulted in the following sua sponte remand order dated April 12, 2017, issued by Judge Ostrer of this court:
On May 15, 2014, under docket number A-2974-13T3, we dismissed plaintiff's prior notice of appeal in this action, as it sought review of interlocutory orders. We also denied leave to appeal the interlocutory orders in question, and remanded "for the expeditious resolution of the remaining claims and issues in this case."
We found that "the trial judge has erroneously suggested, or concluded, that there are no claims or issues to be adjudicated[.]" We noted, as an example, that "[a]lthough an order entered by the trial judge on October 25, 2013, in denying defendant David Watkins's cross-motion for summary judgment, professes `the case has been disposed of since June 4, 2013 and is considered closed,' that order alone (which refused to adjudicate that motion on its merits) demonstrates that claims remain unresolved in the trial court." We did not intend to suggest that Watkins's claim was the only outstanding claim in need of resolution.
On remand, the trial court granted Watkins's motion for summary judgment on April 14, 2015.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal seeking review of that order, and four other interlocutory orders, including an October 25, 2013, order denying her motion for summary judgment against Gibbons and Wood. That appeal, A-4579-14T3, is now before us.
Upon our review of the appellate record and the parties' briefs, it appears that the trial court has neither adjudicated the claims against Gibbons and Wood nor entered a final order or judgment in this matter. Thus, the appeal remains interlocutory. R. 2:2-3(a); See Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Elizabeth, 224 N.J. 126, 136 (2016) ("[I]n a multi-party, multi-issue case, an order granting summary judgment, dismissing all claims against one of several defendants, is not a final order subject to appeal as of right until all claims against the remaining defendants have been resolved by motion or entry of a judgment following a trial.").
IT IS ON THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL, 2017, HEREBY ORDERED THAT: The matter is temporarily remanded to the trial court for the expeditious resolution of the remaining claims and issues. The trial court shall advise this court, within thirty days, of its plan to resolve plaintiff's claims against defendants Gibbons and Wood. Upon receipt of that information, the court will decide whether the balance of this appeal will move forward. We retain jurisdiction.
Following receipt of the April 12, 2017 remand order, the trial court issued a short opinion dated May 4, 2017. The opinion concluded that there are no outstanding claims against either defendants Gibbons or Wood left to be adjudicated in the trial court:
DECISION
After having carefully reviewed the file and thoroughly researching the matter as ordered, this Court finds that there are no outstanding claims and issues against Defendants Gibbons and Wood. Once this matter was remanded from Federal Court on September 12, 2012, Gibbons was among three Defendants who were not properly reinstated in the instant Superior Court action. See Exhibit A (Order dated January 31, 2014). In that action, Plaintiff Regina Bailey (hereinafter, "Bailey") had moved to reinstate[] her claims against Gibbons. This Court denied that Motion, effectively dismissing Gibbons by leaving him inactive as a defendant. Id. No subsequent motion was made to reinstate Gibbons.
After reviewing the file, this Court located a letter from Bailey's counsel, James M. Marks, II, to Judge Robert L. Polifroni, P.J.Cv. See Exhibit B (Letter dated April 10, 2015). In this letter, Bailey's counsel mentions that Wood "declared bankruptcy. In February 2015 a final bankruptcy hearing was scheduled." Id. Upon review of this information, this Court found that on or about February 18, 2011, Wood filed a Chapter 7 voluntary petition for bankruptcy. See Exhibit C (Chapter 7 Voluntary Petition filed by Andrew J. Pincus of Seidman & Pincus, LLC on behalf of Tanya Wood). In her petition, she listed Bailey as a creditor holding an unsecured nonpriority claim. Id. at Schedule F. Wood also listed this lawsuit under "Suits and administrative proceedings, executions, garnishments and attachments." Id. at Statement of Financial Affairs. Bailey filed no Motion for Relief from [the] Stay. This Court confirmed that the bankruptcy was discharged on or about August 10, 2011. See Exhibit D (Order discharging Debtor). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 727, the case against Wood was discharged and may not be reinstated in the Superior Court.
Therefore, both Gibbons and Wood are no longer defendants in this matter and thus there are no unresolved claims or issues against them.
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Unfortunately, the trial court's May 4, 2017 decision did not fully accomplish the objectives of the second remand. The trial court did not develop a "plan" to resolve the claims against Gibbons and Wood. Instead, the trial court concluded those claims have already been extinguished.
With respect to defendant Gibbons, we do not understand the legal reasons why Gibbons is no longer a viable defendant in this case. The trial court appears to believe that Gibbons needed to make a motion to reinstate his status as an active defendant in the litigation, once the case was remanded from the federal court. We are aware of no such requirement. Cf. R. 4:24-1(d) (regarding remands from the federal court). In a January 31, 2014 order, the trial court crossed out provisions in a proposed order reinstating Gibbons as a defendant (as well as Watkins and Russo after the remand), but supplied no statement of reasons in compliance with Rule 1:7-4(a) explaining why it struck (or refused to reinstate) Gibbons as a defendant. Although we cannot be certain from the confusing record, apparently Gibbons was mistakenly removed as a defendant in the Law Division through a clerical error at the time when the litigation was removed to the federal court. In any event, the court's dismissal of Gibbons from the case has not been sufficiently justified with reasons, which impedes meaningful appellate review by this court.
With respect to Wood, we note the trial court's explanation that Wood is entitled to dismissal of the claims against her because of a discharge in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Wood's bankruptcy petition identifies the claims against her in this case, and lists plaintiff's co-counsel as a creditor. This explanation potentially is sound, but is subject to future scrutiny.
At oral argument on the appeal, plaintiff argued that the claims against Wood founded upon the intentional tort of alleged conversion of property are not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (exempting from discharge any debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.") However, such debts are discharged "unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such debt to be excepted from discharge." 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1). So, if a creditor having a claim against the debtor does not file a timely exception to discharge application, the intentional tort liability is still discharged. This is subject to a further exception, if the debt is not listed or scheduled by the debtor and the creditor lacked notice of the bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3).
The burden of establishing nondischargeability of the debt falls on the creditor who is required to file a timely adversary complaint. See Bankr. R. 4007. The complaint to declare nondischargeability must be "filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under [11 U.S.C. § 341(a)]." Bankr. R. 4007(c).
Here, the present record supplied to us is insufficient to confirm whether plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel received proper service of Wood's petition and, if so, whether plaintiff failed to preserve the conversion claim by seeking a timely exception from the BankruptcyCourt. The record must be developed further in the trial court to address these matters.
In sum, the viability of plaintiff's claims against Gibbons and Wood is, at best, murky. Moreover, the trial court apparently has not entered a comprehensive final judgment. Nor are there specific orders dismissing Gibbons and Wood with prejudice.
All of this convinces us that the appeal remains interlocutory and there has not been a proper final disposition of all issues as to all parties. We are loathe to proceed with the appeal in its present defective state, and decline to grant leave to appeal to address, piecemeal, the issues against the defendants other than Gibbons and Wood. See Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 599 (2008) (underscoring the general policies disfavoring piecemeal review). Much of plaintiff's brief on appeal discusses facts and legal claims against Gibbons in particular. If, hypothetically, Gibbons or Wood, or both of them, remains a defendant in the trial court, the disposition of those claims could affect certain issues or factual contentions involving the other defendants. Moreover, the evidentiary and proof issues are complicated by plaintiff's death, although we anticipate the Estate will seek to rely on plaintiff's deposition testimony pursuant to the hearsay exception in N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1), if any claims are ultimately allowed to proceed to trial.
Given these abundant problems with the existing state of the case, we dismiss the present appeal without prejudice. The matter shall be reactivated in the Law Division, with specific direction to the trial court to conduct a new assessment of the viability of the claims against Gibbons and Wood, respectively. The remand shall be assigned to a different judge, who will have the advantage of a fresh perspective on the issues. To aid in the process, counsel shall provide courtesy copies of the parties' appellate submissions. The trial court shall conduct a case management conference within thirty days of this opinion.
On remand, the trial court shall issue orders and written statements of its reasoning respecting Gibbons and Wood. If the claims against either Gibbons or Wood remain in the case, those claims shall be tried to finality or adjudicated in a dispositive motion. Once the matter is concluded with a final disposition of all issues as to all parties, including Gibbons and Wood, any aggrieved party can file a timely new appeal. In such a new appeal, counsel may re-submit their previous briefs (with any appropriate corrections) to this court, along with supplemental briefs not to exceed fifteen pages each. No other briefs will be permitted without leave of court.
The appeal is dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction, pending further developments in the trial court. The cross-appeal of defendant Rocco seeking frivolous litigation sanctions against plaintiff is denied without prejudice.
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Reed Smith, LLP, attorneys for respondent (Henry F. Reichner, on the brief).
Before Judges Koblitz and Currier.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
PER CURIAM.
In this foreclosure matter, defendant Adesina Ogunlana appeals from the September 19, 2017 order denying her motion to stay a sheriff's sale. Defendant's basis for the stay of the sale was her bankruptcy filing. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i), an automatic stay does not take effect when a debtor has had two or more prior cases dismissed within the year. The automatic stay did not take effect here because defendant filed a third bankruptcy action just before the date of the sheriff's sale. Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Chancery judge to deny a stay of the sale. We affirm.
After defendant defaulted on the loan securing the mortgage on her residential property, plaintiff HSBC Bank National Association, filed a foreclosure action. Defendant did not answer the complaint and final judgment was entered in June 2015. A sheriff's sale was scheduled for September 19, 2017.
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On the day of the sale, defendant requested a stay due to a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, which she had filed the previous day. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2). Defendant had filed two prior petitions for relief in April and July 2017, both of which were dismissed for failure to file schedules. After hearing counsels' arguments, the Chancery judge denied the stay of the sale on September 19, 2017.[1]He noted § 362(c)(4)(A)(i) of the BankruptcyCode provides an exception to the automatic stay generally triggered by a bankruptcy petition filing if two or more prior petitions have been dismissed within the year. As this was defendant's third Chapter 13 filing within five months, the automatic stay did not take effect. Therefore, there were no grounds presented to the court to stay the sheriff's sale.[2]
On appeal, defendant asserts the Chancery judge erred in denying the motion to vacate the sheriff's sale. We disagree. Plaintiff presented evidence of defendant's three bankruptcy filings for relief under Chapter 13. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (c)(4)(A)(i), the automatic stay does not trigger upon the third filing. As there were no other grounds presented to support the application, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Chancery judge to deny a stay of this request.
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Affirmed.
[1] The judge heard additional arguments the next morning following which he reaffirmed his decision.
[2] Defendant's subsequent motion in the Bankruptcy Court to impose an automatic stay was denied on October 13, 2017.
