Monday, December 14, 2020

WAGE GARNISHMENT ARTICLE - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN NJ (201) 646-3333

 

WAGE GARNISHMENT ARTICLE


MICHAEL BANDLER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KARING WITH KINDNESS, INC. and KATHLEEN KENNY, Defendants-Respondents.
Docket No. A-0335-15T1.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued December 6, 2016.
Decided December 29, 2016.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-1770-14.

Michael Bandler, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Francis J. Ballak argued the cause for respondents (Goldenberg, Mackler, Sayegh, Mintz, Pfeffer, Bonchi & Gill, P.A., attorneys; Mr. Ballak and Elliott J. Almanza, on the brief.)

Before Judges Fisher and Ostrer.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

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PER CURIAM.

In an earlier suit in 2012, plaintiff Michael Bandler obtained a default judgment against Evelyn Melillo for $54,159.13; plaintiff later secured an order, entered in that action on October 21, 2012, that directed "execution issue against the earnings of [Melillo] from [her] employer," Karing With Kindness, Inc. That order was served on Karing With Kindness, Inc.: by plaintiff's then attorney in October 2012; by a private process server in April 2013; and by plaintiff by email in May 2013. The employer withheld nothing from Melillo's wages.

In May 2014, plaintiff commenced this action against Karing With Kindness, Inc., and its principal, defendant Kathleen Kenny (collectively, defendants), seeking damages based on their failure to withhold a portion of Melillo's wages pursuant to the terms of the October 21, 2012 order.[1]

Defendants moved for summary judgment based on their contention that plaintiff failed to comply with the proper procedures for obtaining a wage garnishment; specifically, defendants argued that plaintiff failed to comply with N.J.S.A. 2A:17-51[2] and applicable court rules[3] by failing to have the sheriff serve defendants with the process necessary to generate a wage garnishment.

In granting summary judgment, the motion judge agreed with defendants and held that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the October 21, 2012 wage execution order was ever delivered to a sheriff or other qualifying court officer, that a writ of execution was ever issued, or that a writ of execution was served upon defendants by a sheriff or other qualifying court officer.

In appealing, plaintiff argues that defendants "failed to meet their initial summary judgment burden" and that he "raised issues of material facts." We find insufficient merit in plaintiff's arguments to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

For good reason, the acceptable practice — made mandatory by the statute and court rules cited above — is for the sheriff to serve an employer with all appropriate pleadings in order for a judgment creditor to obtain the garnishment of wages owed to a judgment debtor. There is no dispute that, by failing to include the sheriff in his efforts, plaintiff failed to take the appropriate steps; it is irrelevant that plaintiff or his agents may have served the employer with the October 21, 2012 court order or that the employer or its agents — defendants here — had actual knowledge of the order.

We lastly observe that plaintiff would have us view the matter narrowly. His argument is that the only question raised by way of defendants' summary judgment motion — and, therefore, in his view, the only question that should have been decided by the motion judge — was whether the wage garnishment order was served on defendants. He argues that the trial judge should not have decided whether a writ of execution issued and was served by the sheriff. We disagree. The record reveals that, even if defendants' motion papers should be viewed as so limited, the motion judge provided plaintiffs with a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate a writ of execution was issued to and served by the sheriff.[4] When plaintiff failed to come forward on the adjourned return date with evidence to support such a requirement, the motion judge properly granted summary judgment.

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Affirmed.

[1] In another action, plaintiff unsuccessfully sought relief from Melillo's ex-husband based on his alleged failure to provide information about Melillo's assets. Bandler v. Melillo, 443 N.J. Super. 203, 206 (App. Div. 2015).

[2] This statute describes the wage-garnishment process and declares that levy does not occur unless and until a writ of execution is served upon the employer by the sheriff or other officer.

[3] Rule 4:4-3(b) provides that "[u]nless the court otherwise orders, all writs and process to enforce a judgment or order shall be served by the sheriff." And Rule 4:59-1(a) and (e) require that writs of execution be directed to the sheriff, who shall be the sole party responsible for levying on the judgment debtor's property.

[4] Oral argument on the motion was first heard on April 27, 2015. The judge continued the matter until June 26, 2015, so as to provide plaintiff an opportunity to demonstrate a writ of execution had issued. The matter was again adjourned to August 21, 2015; at that time, without evidence a writ of execution issued or was served by the sheriff, the motion judge granted summary judgment.

Friday, December 11, 2020

BEST BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

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MORTGAGE ARTICLE - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HACKENSACK NJ (201) 646-3333

 

MORTGAGE ARTICLE


EMIGRANT MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GINA GENELLO and FRANK GENELLO, Defendants-Appellants, and
PALISADE COLLECTION, Defendant.

No. A-1297-16T2.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted March 13, 2018.
Decided June 1, 2018.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No. F-045130-08.

Dunne, Dunne & Cohen, LLC, attorneys for appellants (Frederick R. Dunne, III, of counsel and on the brief).

Knuckles Komosinski & Manfro, LLP, attorneys for respondent (John E. Brigandi, on the brief).

Before Judges Hoffman and Gilson.


NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

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PER CURIAM.

Defendants Gina and Frank Genello (defendants) appeal from an October 21, 2016 Chancery Division order denying their motion to vacate the sheriff's sale of their home, which occurred on September 13, 2016. Because they did not receive notice of the adjourned date of the sheriff's sale, defendants argue the trial court decision constituted an abuse of discretion and resulted in "a miscarriage of justice." We affirm.

On May 31, 2007, Gina Genello executed a promissory note to plaintiff Emigrant Mortgage Company (Emigrant) for $383,500, and defendants secured the loan with a non-purchase money mortgage on their home in West Caldwell. Beginning in June 2008, defendants stopped making their monthly payments under the note and mortgage. Emigrant filed a foreclosure action on November 13, 2008, after defendants failed to cure their default. Defendants filed an answer and counterclaim.

On September 16, 2010, the parties entered into a forbearance agreement, whereby defendants withdrew their answer and counterclaim with prejudice, allowing the foreclosure to proceed uncontested in exchange for a six-month stay of the foreclosure proceedings. The agreement provided for an additional three-month stay if defendants found a buyer for their home. The agreement did not require defendants to make regular monthly payments, only monthly escrow payments. Thereafter, the court dismissed the case, assuming it had settled.

Emigrant then filed a motion to restore the action. Defendants opposed the motion, which the court granted on March 21, 2016, but on the condition that Emigrant not seek default interest when it applied for final judgment.

On December 4, 2014, Emigrant filed a motion for final judgment. On July 22, 2015, the court entered final judgment against defendants for $673,220.99 and ordered the sale of the property. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied on August 7, 2015. Defendants appealed from the final judgment and order denying reconsideration, and we affirmed. Emigrant Mortg. Co. v. Genello, No. A-0292-15 (App. Div. Dec. 2, 2016).

On May 26, 2014, Emigrant sent correspondence to defendants advising of the sheriff's sale date. Defendants requested two adjournments pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36, which postponed the sale until July 5, 2016. On that date, defendants filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, resulting in another postponement of the sheriff's sale. A lack of supporting documentation lead to the dismissal of defendants' bankruptcy proceeding, and the rescheduling of the sheriff's sale for September 13, 2016. Emigrant did not notify defendants of the new sale date.

On September 13, 2016, Emigrant purchased the property at the sheriff's sale for $100. Upon learning of the sale, defendants filed a motion to vacate the sale on September 22, 2016, arguing the sale was unfair and prejudicial absent further notice by Emigrant. The judge denied defendants' motion but extended their redemption period to November 1, 2016. Defendants now appeal on the same grounds.

On appeal, defendants seek reversal of the order denying their motion to vacate the sheriff's sale, arguing that our decision in First Mutual Corp. v. Samojeden, 214 N.J. Super. 122 (App. Div. 1986) requires this result. In Samojeden, we held that our court rules, "as a matter of fundamental fairness[,] . . . must be construed as entitling interested parties to actual knowledge of the adjourned date upon which the sale actually takes place." Id. at 123.

We review the trial court's denial of defendants' motion to vacate the sheriff's sale under an abuse of discretion standard. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). The Court finds an abuse of discretion when a decision is "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).

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We recognize that a court of equity may set aside a sale and provide the defendant with notice of another sheriff's sale. First Trust Nat'l Ass'n v. Merola, 319 N.J. Super. 44, 49 (App. Div. 1999). "The general rule is that when insufficient notice of a sheriff's sale is given, the preferred remedy is that which restores the status quo ante to the greatest extent possible." New Brunswick Sav. Bank v. Markouski, 123 N.J. 402, 425 (1991). The court may void the sale if the party promptly seeks relief, was unaware of the pending sale, and no innocent third parties would be prejudiced. Ibid. (citation omitted).

However, the remedy to void the sale requires "some evidence of actual prejudice to an interested party." G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Marilao, 352 N.J. Super. 274, 283 (App. Div. 2002). The power to void the sale is "discretionary and must be based on considerations of equity and justice." First Trust Nat'l Ass'n, 319 N.J. Super. at 49. We defer to that exercise of discretion, absent a mistake of law or an abuse of discretion. Ibid.

Independent of statutes or court rules, the court may grant equitable relief to set aside a sheriff's sale or to order redemption when irregularities occur in the conduct of the sale, such as fraud, accident, mistake or surprise. Orange Land Co. v. Bender, 96 N.J. Super. 158, 164 (App. Div. 1967). While we held in Samojeden that fundamental fairness entitles all "interested parties to actual knowledge of the adjourned date upon which the sale actually takes place," we did not hold that the absence of such notice requires the court to vacate the sale in every case. 214 N.J. Super. at 123.

Here, the trial court carefully exercised its discretion by crafting a remedy of extending the redemption period by ten days rather than vacating the sheriff's sale. The court balanced the equities of the parties, noting the lengthy history of this matter, where defendants had not made any mortgage payments in over eight years, while Emigrant "paid the taxes . . . paid the insurance," without "access to the collateral" securing its mortgage loan. In addition, the court noted, "There's no . . . evidence to indicate . . . there was going to be a purchase at the sale or [that] some modification . . . was underway." The court further noted that defendants were effectively on notice that the sheriff's sale would be rescheduled after the bankruptcy court dismissed their petition. In essence, the court found that Emigrant's failure to provide formal notice did not prejudice defendants. Indeed, the court gave defendants ten days to redeem the property, but they failed to make the redemption. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision.

Affirmed.

Wednesday, December 9, 2020

CHAPTER 7 ARTICLE - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

 

CHAPTER 7 ARTICLE


JOAN MARIE HOFFMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
J.P. MORGAN CHASE and CALIBER HOME LOANS, Defendants-Respondents.
No. A-4566-17T4Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued telephonically May 13, 2019.
Decided June 5, 2019.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Somerset County, Docket No. C-012005-18.

Joan Marie Hoffman, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Robert T. Yusko argued the cause for respondent Caliber Home Loans (Perkins Coie LLP, attorneys; Robert T. Yusko, on the brief).

Eva K. Carey argued the cause for respondent J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (Bertone Piccini, LLP, attorneys; Eva K. Carey, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges Fasciale and Rose.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

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This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals from two orders: an April 30, 2018 order dismissing the amended complaint against defendant Caliber Home Loans (Caliber); and a June 8, 2018 order dismissing the complaint against defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase), improperly pled as J.P. Morgan Chase. Judge Margaret Goodzeit entered the orders and rendered comprehensive and thorough opinions. We affirm.

Almost eleven years ago, a bank instituted a residential foreclosure complaint against plaintiff, who immediately filed an answer contesting the bank's allegations. In November 2009, the bank obtained final judgment, which the court amended. The Sheriff then scheduled the sale of the property. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 petition, which stayed the sale. The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition in October 2016, and although the Sheriff re-listed the sale, plaintiff stayed it again by filing a Chapter 7 petition. The bankruptcy court lifted the stay, refusing to stay the sale any further, despite multiple applications by plaintiff.[1] Plaintiff filed this complaint in January 2018, and the Sheriff sale of the property occurred in June 2018.

In this complaint, plaintiff alleged she proposed to redeem the property in March 2010, Chase failed to respond, Caliber became the servicer of the loan in July 2015, and Caliber provided a pay-off figure to plaintiff in November 2017. The judge entered the orders under review dismissing the complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e), the entire controversy doctrine (ECD), res judicata, and collateral estoppel.

On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred by dismissing the complaint by relying on the ECD. Indeed, her merits brief focuses solely on the ECD, although at oral argument before us, she contended that the judge erroneously relied on the other bases for dismissing this case. Plaintiff urges us to reverse the orders and award her damages.

We conclude that plaintiff's contentions are without sufficient merit to warrant attention in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We reach that conclusion even considering plaintiff's new arguments on appeal, on the record that she expanded without court order. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Goodzeit.

Affirmed

[1] Plaintiff filed at least three other bankruptcy petitions, seeking further stays of the sale. The bankruptcy court dismissed the petitions and denied each of her requests to stay the sale of the property.

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Monday, December 7, 2020

WAGE GARNISHMENT - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HACKENSACK NJ (201) 646-3333

 

Are You In Jeopardy Of Your Wages Being Garnished?


BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEY IN HACKENSACK NEW JERSEY


Wage garnishment occurs when money is taken directly out of your paycheck by the entity that you owe it to before you receive the check.  Wage garnishments are done when you owe a creditor or the government money that you could not or would not pay of your own volition.  The creditor will get a judgment against you from the court which gives it permission to remove money from your check.  Wages may be garnished for debts owed to creditors, failure to pay student loans, or because of unpaid taxes.  The government does not need a judgment by the court to garnish your wages.

There are limits to the amount of money that can be deducted from your paycheck.  Wage garnishment must be no more that 25% of your disposable income.  It is not uncommon for employers to hold back a larger percentage of your earned income than the 25% allowable by law.  An experienced New Jersey bankruptcy lawyer like Rafael Gomez can assist you in recovering those wages and can also educate you on the wage garnishment process.

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IRS Wage Garnishment


One of the most frequent users of the wage garnishment process is the IRS.  The amount they can garnish depends on the amount of money owed, marital status and how many dependents you have.  When a state court orders a garnishmentstate law determines the maximum amount that may be removed from your paycheck.

It is mandatory for the IRS to send you a notice stating that the back taxes you owe will be recovered by the process of wage garnishment.  Such letters are usually sent out 30 days prior to the start of this tax recovery process.

When the Internal Revenue Service starts threatening you with wage garnishment and levies, and you have exhausted all other means of trying to resolve your debt problems, you should contact northern New Jersey bankruptcy lawyer Rafael Gomez for a free bankruptcy consultation.

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If you need help with a wage garnishment matter, contact Rafael Gomez at (201) 646-3333.

Friday, December 4, 2020

CHAPTER 7 ELIGIBILITY - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HACKENSACK NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

 

CHAPTER 7 ELIGIBILITY 

(201) 646-3333 
BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HACKENSACK  NEW JERSEY

To qualify for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor may be an individual, a partnership, or a corporation or other business entity. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41), 109(b). Subject to the means test described above for individual debtors, relief is available under chapter 7 irrespective of the amount of the debtor's debts or whether the debtor is solvent or insolvent. An individual cannot file under chapter 7 or any other chapter, however, if during the preceding 180 days a prior bankruptcy petition was dismissed due to the debtor's willful failure to appear before the court or comply with orders of the court, or the debtor voluntarily dismissed the previous case after creditors sought relief from the bankruptcy court to recover property upon which they hold liens. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(g), 362(d) and (e). In addition, no individual may be a debtor under chapter 7 or any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code unless he or she has, within 180 days before filing, received credit counseling from an approved credit counseling agency either in an individual or group briefing. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 111. There are exceptions in emergency situations or where the U.S. trustee (or bankruptcy administrator) has determined that there are insufficient approved agencies to provide the required counseling. If a debt management plan is developed during required credit counseling, it must be filed with the court.

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One of the primary purposes of bankruptcy is to discharge certain debts to give an honest individual debtor a "fresh start." The debtor has no liability for discharged debts. In a chapter 7 case, however, a discharge is only available to individual debtors, not to partnerships or corporations. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1). Although an individual chapter 7 case usually results in a discharge of debts, the right to a discharge is not absolute, and some types of debts are not discharged. Moreover, a bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish a lien on property.

Wednesday, December 2, 2020

WHAT IS THE PROCESS? - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

 HACKENSACK BANKRUPTCY LAWYER


Understanding the bankruptcy process is an important part in determining whether to file for bankruptcy and getting a clear picture of what you are up against over the next several months. The timeline and process associated with filing for bankruptcy in New Jersey will vary depending upon whether you file a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 case, but the basic process has been laid out below:



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You can help ensure that the bankruptcy process goes as smoothly as possible and that your debt is successfully discharged by working with an experienced New Jersey Bankruptcy attorney.

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