BANKRUPTCY ARTICLE - LAWYER IN NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

 

SANDRA STEUDTNER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PATRICIA PECORARO, Defendant-Respondent.No. A-4262-11T1.Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.Submitted January 9, 2013.Decided August 8, 2013.

Brian R. Quentzel, attorney for appellant.

John W. Sywilok, attorney for respondent.

Before Judges Nugent and Haas.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Sandra Steudtner appeals from the denial of her motion for reconsideration of a Law Division judge's order that cancelled and discharged her judgment lien against defendant Patricia Pecoraro's residence under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1. That statute authorizes the cancellation and discharge of a judgment lien that was discharged or dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings. The Law Division judge had earlier determined that the parties' dispute about whether the judgment lien was dischargeable in defendant's bankruptcy proceedings should have been addressed by plaintiff during those proceedings. When the judge made that determination, he failed to appreciate the significance of plaintiff's evidence that the judgment lien had not been discharged, and was not dischargeable, during the bankruptcy proceedings. Consequently, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration should have been granted. We reverse the order denying that motion.

The parties do not dispute the facts. Plaintiff sued defendant in the Special Civil Part for breach of contract, and the parties settled the suit. Defendant breached the settlement agreement and in January 2007^[1] plaintiff secured a judgment in the amount of $13,132 against defendant. More than two years later, on November 17, 2009, plaintiff recorded the judgment.^[2]

(201)646-3333 | SPECIALIST BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEY | New Jersey, New York, Newark, Hackensack | (2021) - YouTube

On March 2, 2010, the court issued a writ of execution, which a sheriff's officer served on defendant on May 17, 2010. The next month, on June 24, 2010, defendant filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, listing plaintiff as a creditor in the petition's "Schedule F, Creditors Holding Unsecured Non-priority Claims."

Although defendant petitioned the Bankruptcy Court to discharge her debt to plaintiff, she did not petition the court to cancel the judgment lien on her residence. Rather, in the petition's "Schedule A — Real Property," she represented that her home's value was $399,900 and that she owed a mortgage balance of $344,734.35, leaving $55,165.65 in equity. Against that equity, defendant claimed an exemption of $21,625 under 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(1). Thus, based on the information provided by defendant in her bankruptcy petition, she had $33,540.65 in equity in her home not subject to exemptions; more than double plaintiff's judgment lien of $13,132.

In September 2010, the bankruptcy trustee filed a "Report of No Distribution," in which he reported "that there is no property available for distribution from the estate over and above that exempted by law." On January 18, 2011, the bankruptcy judge entered an order discharging defendant.^[3]

A year later, in January 2012, plaintiff filed a motion in the Law Division to "maintain the status quo." She sought to have the court both extend indefinitely the writ of execution and direct the sheriff not to return the writ. Plaintiff supported her motion with her attorney's certification, which recounted the entry of the judgment, her attempts to collect the judgment from defendant's personalty, defendant's obstruction of that process, and the sheriff's levy on defendant's residence. The attorney averred that defendant's discharge in bankruptcy prevented plaintiff from pursuing personal liability against defendant, and that "the [p]laintiff is now limited to the real property, upon which was levied prior to the onset of the [d]efendant's Chapter 7 bankruptcy case." Explaining that the writ she had obtained before defendant declared bankruptcy was scheduled to be returned in March 2012, two years from the date it was issued, plaintiff sought to maintain the status quo "by extending the life of the subject writ of execution and continu[ing] its levy upon the subject property[.]"

In response to plaintiff's motion, defendant filed a cross-motion seeking to have the court discharge and cancel the judgment under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1, which provides in pertinent part:

At any time after 1 year has elapsed, since a bankrupt was discharged from his debts, pursuant to the acts of Congress relating to bankruptcy, he may apply, upon proof of his discharge, to the court in which a judgment was rendered against him, or to the court of which it has become a judgment by docketing it, or filing a transcript thereof, for an order directing the judgment to be canceled and discharged of record. . . . Where the judgment was a lien on real property owned by the bankrupt prior to the time he was adjudged a bankrupt, and not subject to be discharged or released under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, the lien thereof upon said real estate shall not be affected by said order and may be enforced, but in all other respects the judgment shall be of no force or validity, nor shall the same be a lien on real property acquired by him subsequent to his discharge in bankruptcy. (Emphasis added).

The dispositive question on defendant's cross-motion was whether plaintiff's judgment lien was "subject to be discharged or released under the provision of the Bankruptcy Act." The judge never directly addressed or answered that question. Rather, he decided that the issue should have been resolved in the bankruptcy court, believing that "otherwise there's no point in having a [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt."

In her opposition to the cross-motion, plaintiff explained that she was attempting to levy upon the non-exempt equity in defendant's home; that N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1 existed to eliminate a lien that impaired a defendant's exempt equity only; and that her judgment lien did not impair defendant's exempt equity. Defendant responded that the bankruptcy trustee's decision not to pursue her property demonstrated that the property had no equity, and she had therefore satisfied N.J.S.A. 2A:26-49.1.

In separate orders entered on February 17, 2012, the Law Division judge denied plaintiff's motion to maintain the status quo and granted defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the judgment lien. As previously stated, the judge granted defendant's motion on the basis that plaintiff had not resolved in the bankruptcy action the issue she was now raising; and that she was placing the court in a position of superseding the bankruptcy proceedings. Declining to substitute his judgment for that of the bankruptcy trustee, the judge discharged the judgment lien.

Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which the judge denied on March 16, 2002. In a written decision, the judge found plaintiff failed to satisfy the reconsideration standard. The judge relied, in large part, on the Chapter 7 trustee abandoning the property as there being no equity in the property.

Plaintiff appealed. The sole argument plaintiff presents on this appeal is:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY DISCHARGING THE PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT LIEN.

Plaintiff repeats the substantive arguments that she made in the Law Division and also asserts that the denial of her motion for reconsideration was palpably incorrect. Defendant disputes neither the procedural history nor the facts set forth by plaintiff, "except to assert that [defendant] is not precluded from re-opening the bankruptcy and filing an [a]ffirmative [m]otion under 11 U.S.C.A. Section 522(f) to avoid the [plaintiff's] lien."

When a party appeals from an order denying a motion for reconsideration, we review the denial under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Marinelli v. Mitts & Merrill, 303 N.J. Super. 61, 77 (App. Div. 1997). An abuse of discretion occurs when the basis for the judge's decision is either "palpably incorrect or irrational"; or when the judge has "failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence." Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544 (2002). Here, the basis for the judge's decision is incorrect.

When a debtor attempts to discharge a valid and perfected^[4] judgment lien on real property under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1, "the threshold and controlling issue is whether the judgment [lien] was subject to discharge or release in bankruptcy." Gaskill v. Citi Mortg., Inc., 428 N.J. Super. 234, 241 (App. Div. 2012). The statute applies if "the debtor could have obtained a discharge of the lien through the bankruptcy proceedings, [even if] the debtor [did] not . . . actually obtai[n] a discharge of the lien." Ibid.

"[W]hether a judgment lien is `subject to discharge or release' [under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1] must be measured by the circumstances existing as of the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition." Chem. Bank v. James, 354 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 2002). Consequently, "[a]bandonment of property by the trustee does not affect whether a judgment lien is subject to discharge or release." Gaskill, supra, 428 N.J. Super. at 241. In the case before us, the motion judge erroneously based its decision on a report from the bankruptcy trustee who had apparently abandoned the real property that was subject to the judgment lien.

To determine whether plaintiff's judgment lien was subject to discharge, we turn to the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to "avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled ... if such lien is a judicial lien. . . ." 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f)(1)(a). Here, defendant claimed an authorized exemption in the amount of $21,625. As plaintiff explained to the Law Division judge, due to the amount of equity in defendant's home, defendant's exemption was not impaired by the judicial lien. The lien was not subject to discharge under 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f)(1)(a), and defendant did not argue that her lien was subject to discharge under any other section of the Bankruptcy Code.

Plaintiff demonstrated on the motion record, on undisputed facts, that her judgment lien "was a lien on real property owned by [defendant] prior to the time [s]he was adjudged a bankrupt, and not subject to be discharged or released under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act[.]" N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1. Defendant produced no competent evidence to the contrary, and does not argue before us that the judgment lien was subject to discharge under the Bankruptcy Act. Rather, she asserts that she is "not precluded from re-opening the bankruptcy and filing an [a]ffirmative [m]otion under 11 U.S.C. Section 522(f) to avoid ... the lien." That assertion appears to be based on her belief that the value of her residence has further depreciated.

(201)646-3333 | BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HUDSON COUNTY | NJ | JERSEY CITY - HOBOKEN - BAYONNE - (2021) - YouTube

My name is Sarah Bermudez, I'm here at the office of Rafael Gomez and he's had a case for my family and I recommend him, he'll do a great job for you.

The motion judge misapplied his discretion when he denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. He did not analyze whether the lien was subject to discharge. He should have granted plaintiff's motion and should have vacated his previous order cancelling and discharging her judgment lien against defendant.

Plaintiff has not appealed the denial of her motion to "maintain the status quo," believing that it may be "premature" to address the issue. Plaintiff nevertheless expresses her "belief" that the underlying writ of execution should be extended for the amount of time that it was stayed during defendant's bankruptcy proceedings. That issue is not properly before us and we therefore decline to address it.

The February 17, 2012 Law Division order cancelling and discharging plaintiff's judgment, and the order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, are reversed. The parties may pursue in the Law Division, or in bankruptcy court, any remedies that may be available to them.

Reversed.

[1] Two certifications in the appellate record state that judgment was entered on January 23, 2006. A writ of execution states that judgment was entered on January 23, 2007. The order entering judgment is not included in the appellate record.

[2] A creditor who has docketed a judgment against a debtor "has a lien on all real property held by the judgment debtor in the state." New Brunswick Sav. Bank v. Markouski, 123 N.J. 402, 411-412 (1991); accord, New Century Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Staples, 379 N.J. Super. 489, 494 (App. Div. 2005). Accordingly, the "act of docketing ... a Special Civil Part judgment in the Superior Court makes it a judgment entitled to lien status against the real property of the judgment debtor." New Century Financial, supra, 379 N.J. Super. at 496; see N.J.S.A. 2A:18-32.

[3] After the bankruptcy case was closed, the court reopened it on defendant's motion to address a debt that appears to be irrelevant to the issues raised in this appeal.

[4] Plaintiff perfected its judgment lien against defendant's real property "by levying against it prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition." New Century Financial, supra, 379 N.J. Super. at 497.

MORTGAGE ARTICLE - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

 

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MAXWELL J. BROTHERS, Defendant-Appellant, and
BARBARA J. BROTHERS, HIS WIFE, AND MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., AS NOMINEE FOR QUICKEN LOANS, INC., Defendants.

No. A-3327-15T2.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted June 1, 2017.Decided July 10, 2017.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Mercer County, Docket No. F-29885-09.

Maxwell J. Brothers, appellant pro se.

Stern, Lavinthal & Frankenberg, and Sandelands Eyet, attorneys for respondent (Robert D. Bailey, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges O'Connor and Whipple.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Maxwell Brothers appeals from a March 16, 2016 order denying his emergent application to stay the sheriff's sale of property in Ewing Township. We affirm.

(201)646-3333 | BANKRUPCY ATTORNEY IN PASSAIC COUNTY | NJ | HAWTHORNE - HALEDON - CLIFTON - (2021) - YouTube

My name is Paulino I am a client of Rafael Gomez, he's really intelligent, stays on top of his duties. I strongly recommend him as your lawyer, come through.

Plaintiff Nationstar Mortgage, L.L.C.^[1] filed a foreclosure complaint against defendants Maxwell Brothers, his wife, Barbara Brothers, and Quicken Loans on June 8, 2009. No defendant filed an answer, and default was entered May 18, 2011. Defendant, Maxwell Brothers, filed an emergent application for a stay on March 16, 2016, the day of the scheduled sheriff's sale. The trial court heard argument and considered defendant's emergent application that day. Defendant argued he was not served with the foreclosure complaint. The judge denied the application, relying on the court's JEFIS^[2] record indicating defendant was served with the complaint in 2009. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court's order should be reversed because he was never served with the foreclosure complaint. We disagree.

Rule 4:4-3(a) provides, If personal service cannot be effected after a reasonable and good faith attempt, . . . service may be made by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the usual place of abode of the defendant or a person authorized by rule of law to accept service for the defendant or, with postal instructions to deliver to addressee only, to defendant's place of business or employment. If the addressee refuses to claim or accept delivery of registered or certified mail, service may be made by ordinary mail addressed to the defendant's usual place of abode. The party making service may, at the party's option, make service simultaneously by registered or certified mail and ordinary mail, and if the addressee refuses to claim or accept delivery of registered mail and if the ordinary mailing is not returned, the simultaneous mailing shall constitute effective service.

The trial judge addressed the issue of service when denying the emergent application. During the hearing, defendant testified the property was his residence, but he was never served with the foreclosure complaint.

A review of the transcript reveals the judge referred to the court's JEFIS file and discovered plaintiff provided proof to the court it served defendant by both certified and regular mail. Plaintiff provided certifications, which stated service had been completed by certified and regular mail as confirmed by the United States Postal Service, on December 28, 2009. Plaintiff also included the appropriate electronic confirmation the certified mail was "unclaimed" and the regular mail was not returned. The court was satisfied plaintiff established proper service under Rule 4:4-3.

Moreover, the trial judge advised defendant he had recourse to seek two statutory adjournments pursuant to the sheriff's directive about the sale, which defendant had not attempted to do. We discern no error in the trial judge's finding defendant was properly served with the complaint. Defendant's chief argument is the court erred in relying upon the allegedly false submissions of plaintiff regarding service but provides no demonstration of error beyond his dissatisfaction with the outcome.

(201)646-3333 | BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEY IN ESSEX COUNTY | 07648 07649 07650 07652 07656 07657 | (2021) - YouTube

Hello my name is Christian, Rafael Gomez helped me with moving violation that I had well he got my charge down so somewhere where I was a lot better than before so I really recommend him. sincerely grateful to him and it made the charge a lot better than it was before. So thank you

To the extent defendant makes any other arguments, we find they lack merit and do not warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

[1] The original plaintiff in this matter was BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. Nationstar Mortgage, L.L.C. was substituted as plaintiff by the court in an order dated January 10, 2014.

[2] JEFIS stands for Judiciary Electronic Filing and Imaging System. Defendant asserts he was not shown the JEFIS file in court but looked at it a few days later.

CHAPTER 13 ARTICLE - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN HUDSON COUNTY NJ (201) 646-3333

 

RICHARD FELLOWS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PATTI E. FELLOWS n/k/a PATTI E. GENARD, Defendant-Respondent.No. A-1798-09T2.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued November 9, 2010.Decided August 1, 2011.

Thomas G. Smith argued the cause for appellant.

Mona R. Raskin argued the cause for respondent.

Before Judges Carchman and Graves.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, plaintiff Richard Fellows appeals from an order dated November 4, 2009, that granted a motion by defendant Patti Genard to enforce the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA). The order provides that plaintiff is solely responsible for a debt to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) the parties incurred prior to the divorce. The order also requires plaintiff to indemnify and reimburse defendant for the monies deducted from her wages as a result of an IRS levy and to obtain a life insurance policy with defendant as beneficiary in the amount of $250,000.

On appeal, plaintiff contends "the findings of the trial court were not sufficiently supported by the facts." Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we are satisfied that plaintiff's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We therefore affirm with only the following comments.

The parties were married in 1988, separated in December 1999, and a judgment of divorce (JOD) was entered on December 13, 2001. The JOD incorporated a PSA signed by both parties on September 24, 2001. In Article 19 of the PSA, the parties agreed that defendant would receive the former marital residence located at Cape May Beach together with her pension and tax deferred annuity, and she relinquished all right, title, and interest in plaintiff's business, known as Fellows Family Chiropractic Center.

(201)646-3333 | BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEY IN NEW JERSEY | ESSEX COUNTY - WEST ORANGE - WEST CALDWELL(2021) - YouTube

Hi my name is Christopher Mercado, my wife and I came to our lawyer Rafael Gomez, he helped us with a personal problem, a legal problem, very attentive, very patient and he was there when we had any questions and we really appreciated itself and I would recommend him to anyone.

In Article 19.3 of the PSA, the parties acknowledged that the IRS debt was acquired during the marriage and each agreed to "separately [file] an Offer of Compromise Form with the IRS." If the IRS accepted defendant's offer of compromise, plaintiff agreed to pay it. As originally drafted, Article 19.4 stated that "[i]n the event the Offer of Compromise is not accepted by the IRS the parties agree to mediate this issue." However, that language was crossed out and replaced with the following handwritten substitution that was initialed by the parties: "The husband agrees to assume the tax liability for those years that returns were filed jointly. The wife agrees to cooperate in every way possible to reduce the amount of this liability." In addition, it was agreed that defendant would "file for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy," and plaintiff would "make all Chapter 13 payments directly to the Trustee through June 30, 2002."

Defendant filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in 2001, and both parties filed offers in compromise that were rejected by the IRS. In April 2007, plaintiff filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition listing, among other obligations, $322,562 in debt to the IRS for income taxes due from 1994 through 2005; "Assorted Employer Taxes" from 1996 through 2005 in the amount of $41,073; and "Employer 940 and 941 Tax Liability" from 1995 through 2003 in the amount of $129,611. Plaintiff was granted a Chapter 7 discharge on August 3, 2007.

When defendant learned of the discharge, she moved to reopen plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding. In a certification in support of her motion, defendant stated that she did not receive notice of the bankruptcy proceeding or plaintiff's discharge, and, based on the PSA, she demanded reimbursement for any monies she was required to pay the IRS. On February 11, 2009, the bankruptcy court entered a consent order stating that any obligation found to be due under the parties' JOD or PSA "was not discharged by the bankruptcy."

Following the entry of the consent order, defendant moved before the Superior Court to enforce the terms of the PSA. In her amended notice of motion, defendant sought an order requiring plaintiff to: (1) reimburse her for the monies that were being deducted from her paychecks as a result of an IRS levy; (2) pay "an amount that will retire the [IRS] debt within a reasonable period of time"; and (3) "complete an insurance application and submit to a medical examination . . . so that she [could] obtain a life insurance policy in the amount of $500,000.00."

The trial court initially heard oral argument on June 12, 2009, but the matter was adjourned to obtain additional information from both parties. When the parties returned to court on October 16, 2009, plaintiff argued that there was no equity in the former marital home in 2002, and that defendant should have eliminated the IRS debt by converting her bankruptcy proceeding "from a 13 to a 7." Plaintiff also argued that defendant "should be responsible for whatever penalties have accrued since 2002."

In an oral decision, the motion judge found there was "a clear and unambiguous assumption of the tax liability" by plaintiff in the PSA and that he was solely responsible for the entire tax debt, including interest and penalties. The court also ordered plaintiff to reimburse defendant for the monies deducted from her wages as a result of the IRS levy, and it directed plaintiff to obtain a life insurance policy in the amount of $250,000. The trial court's decision was memorialized in an order dated November 4, 2009.

(201)646-3333 | BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEY IN NEW JERSEY | BEHIND ON RENT - EVICTION - TENANTS | (2021) - YouTube

My name is Ryan Gonzales and I hired my attorney Rafael Gomez to help me in the bankruptcy case, he held me throughout the whole process step-by-step and he was a able to help me with the procedures and going to court I want to thank them. If you need a lawyer I recommend him go check out his website, go to his office, he'll take care of you. Thank you

"Settlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy." Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (quoting Jannarone v. W.T. Co., 65 N.J. Super. 472, 476 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 35 N.J. 61 (1961)). Therefore, the use of voluntary agreements to resolve marital controversies is "`generally favored by the courts as a peaceful means of terminating marital strife and discord so long as they are not against public policy.'" Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 194 (1999) (quoting Gordon v. Gordon, 675 A.2d 540, 544 (Md. 1966)); see also Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 143 (2004). Although the "incorporation of a PSA into a divorce decree does not render it immutable," the agreement is enforceable so long as it is "found to be fair and just." Eaton v. Grau, 368 N.J. Super. 215, 224 (App. Div. 2004).

In this case, the trial court enforced the clear terms of the PSA, and its findings and conclusions are adequately supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998). Accordingly, we find no error or abuse of discretion, and we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the motion judge in his oral decision on October 16, 2009.

Affirmed.

WAGE GARNISHMENT ARTICLE - BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

 

GARDEN STATE ANESTHESIA — RARITAN BAY, Plaintiff,
v.
Ketty SIBILLY, Defendant.

DOCKET No. DC-003294-11.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County. Special Civil Part.

Decided: July 27, 2017.

131Raymond Meisenbacher, Bridgewater, attorney for plaintiff (Raymond Meisenbacher and Sons, PC, attorneys).

Ketty Sibilly, defendant, pro se.

ANKLOWITZ, J.S.C.

The legal issue here is whether child support is exempt from levy, attachment and execution on a money judgment against a parent.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for an unpaid medical bill on April 7, 2011. Judgment was entered by default on June 7, 2017, in the amount of $1871.64 plus costs and statutory attorney's fees. N.J.S.A. 22A:2-42. On April 14, 2017, a Writ of Execution Against Goods and Chattels was issued. The Writ gave credit for payments made and showed a total balance due in the amount of $1,653.38.

(201)646-3333 | BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEY IN NEW JERSEY | BEHIND ON RENT - EVICTION - TENANTS | (2021) - YouTube

My name is Ryan Gonzales and I hired my attorney Rafael Gomez to help me in the bankruptcy case, he held me throughout the whole process step-by-step and he was a able to help me with the procedures and going to court I want to thank them. If you need a lawyer I recommend him go check out his website, go to his office, he'll take care of you. Thank you

On June 9, 2017, a court officer levied on an account of defendant at JP Morgan Chase. The court officer gave notice of the levy by affidavit. Plaintiff filed a motion for turnover of funds on June 27, 2017. On June 30, 2017, defendant filed an objection to the levy. The parties are thus joined in opposition to each other's positions.

On July 27, 2017, defendant testified that her supporting documents were sent to plaintiff's counsel on July 20, 2017. Notice was given to plaintiffs counsel of the hearing, and plaintiff waived its appearance as is permitted under Rule 4:59-1(e).

No statute expressly covers child support as a basis for an objection to a levy, but an analysis of the relevant law warrants a conclusion that child support cannot be the subject of a levy from an ordinary money judgment against a parent.

The law on enforcing judgments makes only a judgment debtor liable. N.J.S.A. 2A:17-15, 16, 17, and 18. Unless there is some exception, like an amercement action, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-29 and N.J.S.A. 40A:9-109, or an action against an employer that refuses to implement a wage garnishment, N.J.S.A. 2A:17-64, the judgment can only be enforced against the judgment debtor and not the debtor's children, friends or others.

"The right to child support belongs to the child and cannot be waived by the custodial parent." Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 591, 660 A.2d 485 (1995) (internal citations omitted). If a parent receives child support for his or her child the money belongs to the child and cannot be used to satisfy a judgment against the parent. Courts have traditionally taken a parens patriae role in protecting the best interest of the child on issues of child support. Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 110, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984).

The Legislature has expressed the intent to enforce child support orders. For 132example, wage garnishments served on an employer for child support take super priority over money judgments. N.J.S.A. 2A:17-52. In addition, N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.8 provides a host of enforcement mechanisms for child support.

Parents are entitled to the "services and earnings" of their children. N.J.S.A. 9:1-1. Child support is typically paid by the other parent from the other parent's services and earnings. In this case the child support order shows the calculation of child support was based on each parent's earnings.

When an adult parent enters into a contract, the contract is ordinarily enforceable like any other contract entered into by an adult. Allgor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 280 N.J. Super. 254, 262, 654 A.2d 1375 (App. Div. 1995). A contract entered into by a minor is not ordinarily enforceable because a minor can disaffirm the contract. Ibid. However, a minor that enters into a contract for student loans and financial aid is considered to be subject to a binding contract. N.J.S.A. 9:17A-2.

Money owed to someone else, including by a parent, cannot be pursued against an innocent owner, including a child. Unless there is some way to show that a child is liable on a debt, which is a covered type of expense for which the judgment or order for child support is meant, that money is not subject to levy because there is already an order or judgment directing the use of that money for the benefit of the child.

Notably, the I.R.S. does not levy on money due and owing for child support. 26 U.S.C. § 6334 lists a number of exemptions from levy for taxes. Subsection (a)(8) exempts:

Judgments for support of minor children. If the taxpayer is required by judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, entered prior to the date of levy, to contribute to the support of his minor children, so much of his salary, wages, or other income as is necessary to comply with such judgment.

(201)646-3333 | LAWYER IN NEW JERSEY - Bergen County , Hudson County, Fairview, Hackensack (2021) - YouTube

Hi my name is Antonio Colombo and I'm from Solano Gilley and Mr. Gomez got my case and one of my kids with me. I'm very happy and I recommend anybody need a lawyer to go to Mr. Gomez

 

Defendant advised that the levy was on a checking account and a savings account. Two transfers from checking to savings totaled $825, and the two transfers were made within a few days of the payment of child support reflected on the probation departments child support account statement. The two child support payments were $515.67 each. Defendant testified that the transferred money was child support money. The remainder of the money in the savings account was either interest or from an unknown source. Whether child support money should or should not be traced was not a contested issue before the court. That issue is left for another day.

At the time of the levy on the checking account on June 9, 2017, the last three deposits were from payroll and other sources not claimed to be exempt from levy. Those amounts more than covered the amount of the levy several times over. Defendant expressly denied having a wage garnishment on her wages deposited into the checking account.

In addition to the strong policy support that child support is for the benefit of the child, child support money is exempt from levy because the child is an innocent third party and not a judgment debtor. The $825 in the savings account is child support that is exempt from the levy and must be released. The remainder of the money is subject to levy and the motion to turnover is granted as to $302.62.

The objection to levy is granted in part and denied in part. The motion to turnover is granted in part and denied in part.

BANKRUPTCY ARTICLE - LAWYER IN HACKENSACK NEW JERSEY (201) 646-3333

  

LILIANA WILSON, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAMES WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.No. A-3867-10T2.Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.Argued December 13, 2011.Decided October 23, 2012.

Jack Dashosh argued the cause for appellant.

Tadd J. Yearing argued the cause for respondent (Townsend, Tomaio & Newmark, L.L.C., attorneys; Mr. Yearing, on the brief).

Before Judges Carchman and Nugent.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant James Wilson appeals from parts of a January 28, 2011 Family Part order that: adjudicated defendant in violation of litigant's rights because of his partial non-compliance with the parties' Supplemental Judgment of Divorce (SJOD); compelled him to make certain payments to plaintiff as required by the SJOD and previous court orders; entered judgment against him for counsel fees that the court had previously ordered him to pay to plaintiff; and required him to communicate with plaintiff about certain issues concerning their child. Defendant also appeals from the denial of his motion for reconsideration. The parties' dispute concerning the building in Romania appears to be moot as the result of bankruptcy proceedings. Otherwise, we affirm.

The parties married on October 23, 1993, and were divorced on April 14, 2009, when the court entered a Final Judgment of Divorce. The court entered a SJOD on June 1, 2010. Among its terms, the SJOD required the parties to continue to attempt to sell a boat they had listed for $139,900, and to divide the net proceeds upon its sale; provided that defendant would sell his business and its European counterparts, and, upon its sale, pay to plaintiff thirty-five percent of the net proceeds; and required that defendant sell a commercial building in Romania and pay to plaintiff an equal share of the net sale proceeds. The SJOD also required defendant to pay plaintiff annual alimony of $30,000 for seven years, provided that the parties would share joint legal custody of their child, denoted defendant as the parent of primary residence, and established a parenting time schedule, as well as child support obligations.

(201)646-3333 | BANKRUPTCY LAW OFFICE IN BERGEN COUNTY NEW JERSEY | SADDLE RIVER - GLEN ROCK (2021) - YouTube

Hi my name is Navi Araz, I'm a client of Rafael Gomez, he's helped me in many situations of my license only reason why I can ride today is because of them. So his expertise, his knowledge it's very appreciated and in a day I feel safe going to Rafael Gomez

On October 23, 2009, after considering cross-motions the parties had filed, the trial court found defendant in violation of litigant's rights for not adhering to the parenting time schedule. Among other forms of relief, the court directed defendant to pay $7,075 representing plaintiff's counsel fees.

Additional motion practice ensued. In December 2010, plaintiff filed another motion to enforce litigant's rights. The court granted that motion in an order entered on January 28, 2011, supported by a written statement of reasons. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied on March 18, 2011. Defendant appealed from those orders.

Following the filing of defendant's notice of appeal, plaintiff filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. It appears that during the bankruptcy proceeding, the trustee accepted defendant's offer to pay $35,000 to buy out plaintiff's interest in the building in Romania.^[1]

Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:

THE COURT ERRED BY NOT DELETING THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS OF ITS JANUARY 28, 2011 ORDER, SPECIFICALLY:

1) PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE ORDER WHICH FOUND DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF LITIGANT'S RIGHTS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE (SJOD) FILED ON JUNE 1, 2010, AND THE COURT ORDERS OF OCTOBER 23, 2009, MARCH 12, 2010 AND JUNE 28 2010, WHICH REQUIRED DEFENDANT TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF IN WRITING OF THEIR SON[`s] EXTRA CURRICULAR SCHOOL ACTIVITIES WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE SAME.

2) THE PORTION OF PARAGRAPH 3 THAT REQUIRED DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE PLAINTIFF WITH AN UPDATED CASE INFORMATION STATEMENT INCLUDING HIS 2010 W-2'S, 1099'S AND 2009 FEDERAL, STATE AND BUSINESS TAX RETURNS DESPITE THE FACT THAT COMMENCING FEBRUARY 11, 2011 DEFENDANT HAS PAID PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $2,000 PER MONTH TOWARD THE $49,919.45 THE COURT AWARDED PLAINTIFF AS HER SHARE OF DEFENDANT'S BUSINESS.

3) PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE ORDER WHICH REQUIRED DEFENDANT TO PURCHASE PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST IN THE ROMANIAN REAL ESTATE AND WHICH REQUIRED DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE AN UPDATED CASE INFORMATION STATEMENT.

4) PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE ORDER WHICH REQUIRED DEFENDANT TO REIMBURSE PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $4,000 REPRESENTING ONE-HALF OF THE TOTAL COST PAID BY THE PARTIES TO ATTEND THE OVERCOMING BARRIERS PROGRAM IN JULY 2010.

5) PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE ORDER WHICH REQUIRED DEFENDANT TO PAY PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $7,075 IN COUNSEL FEES AWARDED TO HER IN THE OCTOBER 23, 2009 COURT ORDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO STATEMENT REGARDING THE BASIS FOR AWARDING THE SAME AND CONTRARY TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE WHICH WAIVED ALL OF THE PARTIES' CLAIMS FOR LEGAL FEES.

6) PARAGRAPH 13 OF THE ORDER WHICH DIRECTS DEFENDANT TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF WITHIN MINUTES OF MEDICAL EMERGENCIES INVOLVING [A.] AND THAT DEFENDANT REFRAIN FROM MAKING NEGATIVE COMMENTS TO [A.] REGARDING PLAINTIFF WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE SAME.

7) THE COURT IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE ONE-HALF THE VALUE OF THE ROMANIAN REAL ESTATE AS OF APRIL 14, 2009 BECAUSE OF DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO LIST THE PROPERTY FOR SALE, WHICH WAS FACTUALLY INCORRECT AND IS CONTRARY TO THE JUNE 1, 2010 JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE.

We first address the effect of the bankruptcy proceeding on the issue raised by defendant concerning plaintiff's interest in the building in Romania. Under federal law, when a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, an estate is created and the estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1). Thus, plaintiff's equitable interest in the building in Romania was part of the bankruptcy estate. See Reid v. Reid, 310 N.J. Super. 12, 20 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998); Colucci v. Colucci, 251 N.J. Super. 73, 78 (Ch. Div. 1991). Generally, "[t]he trustee, after notice and a hearing, may... sell... property of the estate...." 11 U.S.C.S. § 363(b)(1). That is precisely what happened in this case. The sale appears to render moot defendant's issue concerning plaintiff's interest.

(201)646-3333 | ATTORNEY - CHAPTER 7 - CHAPTER 13 - EXEMPTIONS - MORTGAGE - CREDIT CARDS - (2021) - YouTube

Hi my name is Aloma Brown Bruns, my attorney is Raphael Gomez and I'm his client. I'm from Jamaica West Indian st. Catherine and I'm pleased with his professionalism work. He helped me with my car accident when I had a car accident he was very efficient and his Secretary's of our on top of the work they know what they're doing. I will recommend them to anyone who has a accident need to be represented. Thank you so much for your good work

In her supplemental brief, plaintiff argues that the bankruptcy trustee sold her equitable interest in the building in Romania for considerably less than its actual value. Plaintiff has not argued that she was denied a fair opportunity in the bankruptcy proceeding to contest the sale of her interest or challenge the building's value, however. Nor has she attempted to demonstrate how the outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding would have differed had her interest been sold for a greater sum. Under those circumstances, we deem the narrow issue raised by defendant on this appeal — that the trial judge erred by requiring defendant to purchase plaintiff's interest in the Romanian real estate — moot.

After considering defendant's remaining arguments in light of the record and applicable law, we affirm, substantially for the reasons explained by the trial court in the written statements supporting the January 28 and March 18, 2011 orders.

In summary, we deem the issue concerning defendant buying out plaintiff's interest in the Romanian real estate to be moot. We affirm in all other respects.

[1] During oral argument we permitted plaintiff to submit a supplemental letter brief to address the effect of the bankruptcy proceedings on plaintiff's right to equitable distribution of the property in Romania. Plaintiff and defendant both submitted supplemental letter briefs. Although it appears that the bankruptcy trustee disposed of plaintiff's interest in the property, the documents submitted by the parties are uncertified and incomplete.